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THE MYTH OF PROPERTY ABSOLUTISM AND MODERN
GOVERNMENT: THE INTERACTION OF POLICE
POWER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Justice Philip A. Talmadge*
Abstract. A new movement in America espousing a novel doctrine, property-rights
absolutism, has gained some popular and political appeal. But the property rights absolutists
tend to ignore the societal foundations of property, and especially de-emphasize the
responsibilities property owners have to the community in which they live. They fail to
consider properly the significance of the police power and its vital role in the American and
Washington State constitutional systems. This Article debunks the newly minted mythology
of the property-rights absolutists and places the police power and property rights in their
proper historical perspective.

The fundamental roles of government are to regulate public health and
safety, maintain the peace, and provide for the general welfare. The
authority to do these things is usually referred to as the police power.'
The origin of the police power coincides with the dawn of government
generally and certainly finds expression in Washington State's
Constitution, enacted in 1889.
Increasingly, however, the exercise of police power by state and local
government has come under fire by those who assert that the exercise of
Justice, Supreme Court of Washington; J.D., University of Washington, 1976; B.A. Yale
University, 1973. Justice Talmadge has been a member of the court since 1995. He gratefully
acknowledges the work of Bernard Friedman and Molly Terwilliger, without whom this Article
would not have been possible.
1. The term "police power" made its first appearance in the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827). The concept, however, is much older. Blackstone
described the police power as follows: "[T]he due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom,
whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform
their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners; and to be
decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 162
(St. George Tucker ed., Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969) (1803). "The term 'police power' connotes the
time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the
substitution of the familiar standard of 'reasonableness,' this Court has generally refrained from
announcing any specific criteria." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). The
Supreme Court of Washington has opined that the police power precedes constitutional government.
"It is probable that this power is the most exalted attribute of government, and, like the power of
eminent domain, it existed before and independently of constitutions." Conger v. Pierce County, 116
Wash. 27, 35, 198 P. 377, 380 (1921).
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such power impinges too dramatically on property rights.2 Property
rights are, of course, important in the American view of ordered liberty.
The ideologically driven views of modem-day property-rights advocates,
however, would effectively undercut the police power by elevating
policy disputes to constitutional dimensions, thereby transferring the
decision-making process from the people acting through their elected
representatives to the courts. They would turn back the clock to the days
of Lochner v. New York,3 when an activist Supreme Court routinely
overturned state and federal economic regulations.4 Indeed, one
commentator has referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council5 as "superactive" and the opinion's
author, Justice Scalia, as a "judicial imperialist."6 Property-rights
activists would reverse seventy years of American constitutional law and
confer upon courts the power to make local land-use decisions.' Modem
challenges to the exercise of police power, based on the Takings Clause
and substantive due process, are now common.
Modem property absolutists contend the police power may not extend
to any "use" of property. That is, any governmental action affecting a
2. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (1985). Epstein contended the U.S. Supreme Court should alter its historic takings
jurisprudence by applying the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to individual uses of
property. As Epstein theorized, the Takings Clause not only made every government action affecting
a property use compensable, it rendered anything resembling a re-distribution of wealth
unconstitutional. Indeed, Epstein boldly acknowledged the consequences of his views: "I argue that
the eminent domain clause and parallel clauses in the Constitution render constitutionally infirm or
suspect many of the heralded reforms and institutions of the twentieth century: zoning, rent control,
workers' compensation laws, transfer payments, progressive taxation." Id. at x.
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding Congress cannot redress
unequal bargaining power between employer and employee); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
(striking statute making it illegal for employer to require employee to agree not to join union as
condition of employment).
5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6. Robert J. Hopperton, Majoritarian and Counter-Majoritarian Difficulties: Democracy,
Distrust, and Disclosure in American Land-Use Jurisprudence-A Response to Professors
Mandelker and Tarlock's Reply, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 541, 550 (1997). Curiously,
conservatives and libertarians advocate judicial activism in land-use matters, while at the same time
denouncing judicial activism in general. See, e.g., Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of
JudicialConfirmationsin the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 Dick. L. Rev. 247 (1999).
7. Some federal courts have not taken kindly to being used for such purposes. See, e.g., Harding v.
County of Door, 870 F.2d 430, 432 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Federal courts are ordinarily not vehicles to
review zoning board decisions."); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 1986)
("Federal courts should not become zoning boards of appeal to review nonconstitutional land use
determinations.").

Police Power and Property Rights
person's use of property, in any fashion, constitutes a taking entitling that
person to compensation This extreme, indeed revolutionary, conception
of property essentially undercuts any land-use regulation. The people of
Washington State rejected this view at the polls in 1995. 9
While proponents of this view have confined their argument to
interests in land, there is no reason to believe the principle would be so
limited. Certainly intangible property such as stocks and bonds would be
likewise included. Yet the analysis need not stop at personal property.
The so-called "new property"'" interests, such as public assistance or
Social Security, could also be viewed as property worthy of this

constitutional protection." An unbounded view of property rights would
relegate to the courts nearly all disputes over the propriety of a policepower regulation. This is precisely why the courts should be reluctant to
allow property-rights absolutists to "constitutionalize" the line of
8. Some commentators have suggested that well-financed political organizations advance this
extreme view, intending to limit government involvement in land-use matters specifically and to
diminish the influence of government generally. This "Takings Project," using funds from wealthy
individuals benefiting from a limited government, finances legal groups bringing test cases and
attempts to influence judges by paying for judicial-education seminars espousing its views at prime
vacation locales. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Analysis andAssessment ofthe ProgressSo Far,25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 509,539-54 (1998).
9. The Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act, ch. 98, 1995 Wash. Laws 360, purported to
require full compensation for any action by government regulating or limiting any use of property.
With respect to takings, the statute stated:
A portion or parcel of private property shall be considered to have been taken for general public
use when:
(a) a governmental entity regulates or imposes a restraint of land-use on such portion or
parcel of property for public benefit including wetlands, fish or wildlife habitat, buffer zone, or
other public benefit designations; and
(b) no public nuisance will be created absent the regulation ....
Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act, § 4(1), 1995 Wash. Laws 360-61. The statute further
defined "restraint of land use" in this very broad fashion: "any action, requirement, or restriction by
a governmental entity, other than actions to prevent or abate public nuisances, that limits the use or
development or [sic] private property." §7(4), 1995 Wash. Law at 362. This statutory conception of a
taking would have enshrined Professor Epstein's view on takings in Washington law.
Opponents subsequently gathered the requisite signatures to force a vote on the legislation. In the
1995 general election, Referendum 48 passed, 796,869 to 544,788 (or 59 percent to 41 percent),
voiding the legislative enactment See Wash. Rev. Code § 64.42 (1995).
10. See Charles Reich, The New Property,73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
11. At first blush, it would seem this land-oriented view of property merely justifies and protects
the interests of society's wealthier citizens. See generally Howard Gillman, The Constitution
Besieged: The Rise and Demise ofLochner Era Police PowersJurisprudence(1993).
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demarcation between property rights and police power. Public-policy
disputes should remain in the popular branches of government.
The critical concern, however, is the lack of attention the propertyrights absolutists pay to the needs of society and the social
responsibilities of property ownership. Eschewing any communitarian
impulses, 2 the more extreme property advocates contend for an absolute
interest in property protected by the constitution, free of any social or
political regulation. This concept of property is both dangerous and
mythical; neither American heritage nor constitutional law lends support
to an absolutist right to property free of considerations of the
community's interests.
12. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the
Communitarian Agenda (1993). Etzioni describes the reason he and others founded the
communitarian movement in 1990:
[W]e were troubled by the finding that many Americans are rather reluctant to accept
responsibilities. We were distressed that many Americans are all too eager to spell out what they
are entitled to but are all too slow to give something back to others and to the community. We
adopted the name Communitarian to emphasize that the time had come to attend to our
responsibilities to the conditions and elements we all share, to the community.
As Communitarians we also recognized a need for a new social, philosophical, and political map.
The designation of political camps as liberals or conservatives, as left or right, often no longer
serves. We see at one extreme Authoritarians (such as the Moral Majority and Liberty Bell). They
urge the imposition on all others of moral positions they believe in, from prayer in schools to forcing
women to stay in the kitchen. At the other end we see Radical Individualists (libertarians such as the
intellectuals at the Cato Institute; civil libertarians, especially the American Civil Liberties Union;
and laissez-faire conservatives), who believe that if individuals are left on their own to pursue their
choices, rights, and self-interests, all will be well. We suggest that free individuals require a
community, which backs them up against encroachment by the state and sustains morality by
drawing on the gentle prodding of kin, friends, neighbors, and other community members, rather
than building on government controls or fear of authorities.
Id. at 15. Etzioni suggests communitarians are direct intellectual heirs of the Progressive movement
in American politics. Id. at 231-33. The communitarian platform emphasizes the perspective that
social values and individual rights must be considered in our society:
A Communitarian perspective recognizes that the preservation of individual liberty depends on
the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others
as well as self-respect; where we acquire a lively sense of our personal and civic responsibilities,
along with an appreciation of our own rights and the rights of others; where we develop the
skills of self-govemment as well as the habit of governing ourselves and learn to serve othersnot just self.
A Communitarian perspective recognizes that communities and polities, too, have obligationsincluding the duty to be responsive to their members and to foster participation and deliberation
in social and political life.
Id. at 253-54.

Police Power and Property Rights
Washington State's treatment of police power and its limitations are
representative of state law in America. Part I of this Article addresses the
historical treatment of police power and property rights and the
Washington Constitution's treatment of those issues. Part II considers the
development of police-power case law in federal courts and Washington
from 1889 to the present. Part III assesses the limitations on the exercise
of police power found in the law of takings and substantive due process.
Finally, Part IV of this Article offers thoughts on the proper role of the
police power and property rights at the start of the twenty-first century.
1.

POLICE POWER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

The extreme advocates of absolute property rights deny the
importance of the police power as a fundamental attribute of the
government in the regulation of property. Their position is based on an
unsound view of property in Western political philosophy and historical
fact. They mythologize the role of property when human beings were in
the state of nature. 3 More troubling is their failure properly to treat
property and police power in American constitutional law. They argue
for a revolutionary reversal of the relationship between police power and
property unprecedented in the nation's history and unsupported by
federal or Washington constitutional law.
A.

PolicePowerandPropertyin Western PoliticalPhilosophy

The exercise of police power-governmental action to advance public
health, safety, peace, and welfare-has long been a part of the very
nature of government itself. The ancient Greeks recognized early on the
importance of police power in their political philosophy. Indeed,
Aristotle considered the state the highest form of community, existing to
achieve the highest good for its citizens: "The end of the State is the
good life ....And the State is the union of families and villages in a
perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and
honourable life."' 4 In the Aristotelian model, the government's exercise
13. See Martin Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 523, 525 (1995) (criticizing legal academicians for "historical assertions that are at best deeply
problematic and at worst, howlers").
14. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy 186 (1945) (quoting Aristotle, The Politics
1280b.)

Washington Law Review

Vol. 75:857, 2000

of police power was undiminished and unrestrained because the
objective of the state coincided with the highest good. 5
Later, in the great eighteenth century liberal tradition that so
influenced the American constitutional experience, the treatment of
police power was a live controversy, touching upon the extent of
governmental authority generally. John Locke contended government
was a social compact between the governed and the government, existing
to preserve life, liberty, and property; government could take the
necessary steps to secure these fundamental interests. 6 Thomas Hobbes
15. See id. at 1-2. This notion of virtue being an objective of government is echoed in
communitarian writing:
At stake is the question "What constitutes the good society, the virtuous society?" Not
everybody agrees that this question should be asked, let alone answered. Radical individualists
argue that once a certain conduct is defined as virtuous, then an essential foundation of our
society is undermined. They fear that those members of society who fail to display the
characteristics considered virtuous will be treated as inferior, if they are not discriminated
against outright.
Communitarians argue that a society without some shared virtues cannot exist. A society cannot
tolerate a condition in which all behavior is considered of equal merit. We must condemn not
merely murder, rape, robbery, and other behaviors we call crimes (that is, counter to virtue), but
also the destruction of the environment, discrimination against others, and many behaviors that
endanger the sustainability of our communities and the values we hold dear. Moreover, the
ultimate defense against intolerance is not to regard all behavior as equally meritorious but to
consider mutual respect a key societal strength. It is within a healthy social context that social
responsibilities and individual rights find their ultimate home. Struggling to ensure that both are
well attended to goes a long way to make society virtuous.
Amitai Etzioni, Rights and the Common Good: The CommunitarianPerspective 8 (1995).
16. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 303-20 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1960) (1690). Those who assume Locke carved out an impenetrable right of property ownership read
too much into into Locke. Locke believed a person's agreement to enter into society resulted in the
submission of the individual and his property to government as they became "both of them, Person
and Possession, subject to the Government and Dominion of that Commonwealth, as long as it hath a
being." Id.at 366. Locke noted:
For it would be a direct Contradiction, for any one, to enter into Society with others for the
securing and regulating of Property: And yet to suppose his Land, whose Property is to be
regulated by the Laws of the Society, should be exempt from the Jurisdiction of that
Government, to which he himself the Proprietor of the Land, is a Subject.
Id. Further, as Professor James Tully of McGill University observed, Locke believed property
created certain obligations, including charity:
In the same sentence in which he first announces that honest industry naturally entitles a person
to his just products, he also proclaims two other natural titles: charity and inheritance (1.42).
"Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from
extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise." Where no means are available for a
man to provide for himself, the right to the means of subsistence applies directly to another
person's goods. "God the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his Children such a

Police Power and Property Rights

Property, in his peculiar Portion of the things of this World, but that he has given his needy
Brother a Right to the Surplusage of his Goods." A proprietor who has more than enough to
sustain himself is under a positive duty to sustain those who do not: "'twould always be a Sin in
any man of Estate, to let his Brother perish for want of affording him Relief out of his plenty."
James Tully, A Discourseon Property:John Locke and His Adversaries 131-32 (1980). Locke's
invocation of the charitable obligation property ownership conveys upon the owner is perhaps a
reflection of the Biblical injunction:
And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not wholly reap the corners of thy field,
neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvest.
And thou shalt not glean thy vineyard, neither shalt thou gather every grape of thy vineyard;
thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger I am the Lord your God.
Leviticus 19:9-10 (King James).
As Professor Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard Law School contends, however, Locke based his
conception of property on an idealized conception of humans in the state of nature:
The American property saga starts with John Locke-not with Locke the philosopher or Locke
the political theorist, but with Locke the story-teller. Property acquired its near-mythic status in
our legal tradition, in part, because the language and images of John Locke played such a key
role in American thinking about government. The centerpiece of Locke's Second Treatise of
Government was the chapter on property where he presented his famous account of the origin of
individual ownership in an imaginary "state of nature." Like the story of Adam and Eve,
Locke's fable is set in a time and place when the good things of the earth were available in
abundance: "all the World was America." In the beginning, said Locke, God gave the world to
men in common. In the "state of nature," no one originally had dominion over the plants,
animals, and land to the exclusion of others. Yet even then, Locke asserted, there was
property-for "every Man has a Property in his own Person," and in the "Labour of his Body,
and the Work of his Hands." When a man "mixed" his labor with something by removing it
from its natural state, Locke argued, he thereby made that acorn, or apple, or fish, or deer, his
property-"at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others." The same
was true, Locke said, for appropriation of land by tilling, planting, and cultivating.
Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk- The Impoverishment of Political Discourse20-21 (1991). It is
interesting to note how much credence academicians such as Epstein give to Locke's account of
early society without regard to what modem science knows about anthropology and the development
of human civilization. See generally supra note 2. Glendon notes Locke may have had an ulterior
motive for his story:
[1It
is important to remember that Locke, in the Second Treatise, was engaged in no mere
abstract philosophical exercise. His aim was less to propound a rigorous theoretical treatment of
the origins of government than it was to marshal persuasive arguments to legitimate the
transition from unfettered royal power to constitutional monarchy. The Second Treatise is in
many ways more like a lawyer's brief than a learned tract, though it is not always read that way.
As an advocate, Locke knew the case against the divine right of kings would be strengthened if
he could persuasively establish that there are natural rights that exist prior to and independent of
the sovereign state. In the agrarian society of seventeenth-century England, property was the
most appealing candidate for such a right. Locke's inspired choice of property as the
prototypical natural right served simultaneously to delegitimate the monarchy as it then existed,
and to buttress the policital power of both the landed gentry and the rising merchant classes.
Property was the linchpin in his foundations for government based on consent. Once the goal of
parliamentary supremacy was established in England, the Lockean property story faded into the
background there. Property rights continued to be subject to significant limitation by custom
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observed "the life of man [is], solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"' 7
in the state of nature, and strong government-the Leviathan-is needed
to protect the life, liberty, and property of the weak from the
depredations of the strong and ruthless. 8 Indeed, Jefferson's formulation
in the Declaration of Independence that "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" were "unalienable"' 9 rights of individuals to be protected by

government provides an American expression of the principles of the
Liberal tradition. It is noteworthy Jefferson felt governments were
instituted to "secure" these fundamental rights.2"
To secure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, government
plainly required sufficient authority to regulate the lives of the governed.
In fact, the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, recognized constitutional
government must "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."'" These purposes
strongly resemble the purposes of the police power.
and positive law. This has also been the case in Canada and other countries whose political
systems were patterned on the English model.
Id. at 21-22.
Other liberal thinkers were not so effusive as Locke about the benefits of private property in the
natural state. Rousseau theorized property had much to do with greed, power, and violence:
The first person who, having fenced off a plot of ground, took it into his head to say this is mine
and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. What
crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared by
someone who, uprooting the stakes or filling up the ditch, had shouted to his fellow-men:
Beware of listening to this impostor; you are lost if you forget that the fruits belong to all, and
the earth to no one.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourseon the Origins and Foundationsof lnequality Among Men, in The
Firstand Second Discourses 141-42 (Roger D. Masters ed. & trans. & Judith R. Masters trans., St.
Martin's Press 1964) (1754).
As Jeremy Bentham later suggested, quite succinctly, private property is a creation of law, rising or
falling with its actions. See generally Douglas G. Long, Bentham on Property, in Theories of
Property:Aristotle to the Present221 (Anthony Parel & Thomas Flanagan eds. 1974).
17. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 186 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
18. See id. at ch. 17 passim.
19. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
20. The Declaration of Independence preamble (U.S. 1776).
21. U.S. Const. preamble.

Police Power and Property Rights
B.

PolicePower and the U.S. Constitution

The Framers, influenced by the Liberal tradition, never believed the
U.S. Constitution created an unrestricted right to use property.' Chief
22. The Framers thought property rights were conferred by society and were not natural rights.
For instance, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
But while it is a moot question whether the origin of any kind of property is derived from nature
at all ... It is agreed by those who have seriously considered the subject that no individual has,
of natural right, a separate property in an acre of land, for instance. By an universal law, indeed,
whatever, whether fixed or movable, belongs to all men equally and in common is the property
for the moment of him who occupies it; but when he relinquishes the occupation, the property
goes with it. Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress of

society.
6 Henry A. Washington, Writing of Thomas Jefferson 180 (1859).
A right of property in moveable things is admitted before the establishment of government. A
separate property in lands, not till after that establishment. The right to moveables is
acknowledged by all the hordes of Indians surrounding us. Yet by no one of them has a separate
property in lands been yielded to individuals. He who plants a field keeps possession till he has
gathered the produce, after which one has as good a right as another to occupy it. Government
must be established and laws provided, before lands can be separately appropriated, and their
owner protected in his possession. Till then, the property is in the body of the nation, and they,
or their chief as trustee, must grant them to individuals, and determine the conditions of the
grant.
Thomas Jefferson, The Proceedings of the Government of the United States in Maintaining the
Public Right to the Beach of the Mississippi,Adjacent to New Orleans, Against the Intrusion of
Edward Livingstone, in 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 503, 539 (Henry A. Washington ed.,
Derby & Jackson 1859) (1812) (emphasis added).
These thoughts were consistent with the thoughts of other lawyers and thinkers of the Revolutionary
Era. For instance, in oral argument as an attorney before the Supreme Court in Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 210 (1796), future Chief Justice John Marshall said: "[P]roperty is the creature of
civil society, and subject, in all respects, to the disposition and control of civil institutions." In a
similar vein, Benjamin Franklin noted: "Private Property ... is a creature of Society, and is subject
to the Calls of that Society ... even to its last Farthing." Queries and Remarks Respecting
Alterationsin the Constitution ofPennsylvania,in The Writings ofBenjamin Franklin54, 59 (Albert
Henry Smyth ed., 1907) (1778). Franklin was even more direct in other writings:
All property, indeed, except the savage's temporary cabin, his matchcoat, and other little
acquisitions, absolutely necessary for his subsistence ... seems to me to be the creature of
public convention. Hence the public has the right to regulate descents, and all other conveyances
of property, and even of limiting the quantity and uses of it ... But all property superfluous to
such purposes [i.e., the productive resources necessary for subsistence] is the property of the
public, who by their laws, have created it, and who may therefore by other laws dispose of it,
whenever the welfare of the public shall demand such disposition. He that does not like civil
society on these terms, let him retire and live among savages.
William B. Scott, In PursuitofHappiness: American Conceptions ofPropertyfrom the Seventeenth
to the Twentieth Century 21-22 (1977) (quoting Benjamin Franklin, The Political Thought of
Benjamin Franklin358 (Ralph Ketcham ed. 1965)). Justice Samuel Chase wrote in Calderv. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) 386,394 (1798):
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Justice Marshall declared as early as 1823 that "[t]he right to use all
property, must be subject to modification by municipal law. Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non loedas is a fundamental maxim. It belongs exclusively to
the local State Legislatures, to determine how a man may use his own,
without injuring his neighbour., 23 In 1837, the U.S. Supreme Court
further confirmed the limitations on property rights and their necessary
relationship to social interests: "While the rights of private property are
sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have
rights, and that the happiness and well being of every citizen depends on
their faithful preservation."'24
It seems to me, that the right of property, in its origin, could only arise from compact express, or
implied, and I think it the better opinion, that the right, as well as the mode, or manner, of
acquiring property, and of alienating or transferring, inheriting, or transmitting it, is conferred by
society; is regulated by civil institution, and is always subject to rules prescribed by positive
law. When I say that a right is vested in a citizen, I mean, that he has the power to do certain
actions; or to possess certain things, accordingto the law of the land.
Id. (emphasis added). The thinking of Jefferson, Marshall, Franklin, and Chase was surely informed
by the earlier work of Blackstone, who wrote:
It was clear that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities, without the
assistance of tillage: but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another might watch an
opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art and labor? Had not, therefore,
a separate property in lands, as well as movables, been vested in some individuals, the world must
have continued a forest, and men have been mere animals of prey; which, according to some
philosophers, is the genuine state of nature. Necessity begat property; and in orderto insure that
property, recourse was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of
inseparable concomitants; states, government, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of
religious duties. Thus connected together, it was found that a part only of society was sufficient to
provide, by their manual labor, for the necessary subsistence of all; and leisure was given to others
to cultivate the human mind, to invent useful arts, and to lay the foundations of science.
J. W. Ehrlich, Ehrlich's Blackstone 117-18 (1959) (emphasis added). Thomas Paine doubted, to say
the least, that property rights were of divine emanation: '"The Creator of the earth' did not 'open a
land-office from whence the first title-deeds were issued."' Paschal Larkin, Property in the
Eighteenth Century 129 (1930) (quoting Thomas Paine, Agrarian Justice, in The Pioneers of Land
Reform 185 (Max Beer ed., 1796)). More modernly, Justice Antonin Scalia, no enemy of property
rights, said: "It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be
restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise
of its police powers." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (stating,
however, that State may not deprive property of all economically beneficial use without effecting a
taking).
23. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 53-54 (1824).
24. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) 420, 548 (1837). Similarly, the
Washington Supreme Court later noted, "All property is held subject to such restraints and
regulations as the state may constitutionally make in the exercise of its police power." State v.
Lawrence, 165 Wash. 508, 517, 6 P.2d 363, 366 (1931).

Police Power and Property Rights
Even the advocates of a smaller federal governmental presence, such

as Madison, conceded the need for vigorous exercise of government
power by the states:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be

exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of
taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.'
This view was consistent with the law of most of the early state
governments.26 Commentators often overlook the plain differences
between the limited federal government the Founders established and the
25. The FederalistNo. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
26. The contention of property-rights absolutists that colonial America minimally regulated land
is a myth unsupported by any historical scholarship. At the time of the Revolution, the colonies
vigorously regulated land use for purposes other than preventing harm. See John F. Hart, Colonial
Land Use Law and Its SignificanceforModern Takings Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1259-87
(1996).
Many early state laws, for example, allowed community access to private property despite the
hallowed right of property owners to exclude others from their property. For example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1788 listed some of the lawful opportunities for others to enter upon
private land without explicit consent from the owner.
Ifa road be out of repair, a passenger may lawfully go through a private enclosure. So, ifa man
is assaulted, he may fly through another's close. In time of war, bulwarks may be built on
private ground .... Thus, also, every man may, of common right, justify the going of his
servants or horses, upon the banks of navigable rivers, for towing barges, &c., to whomsoever
the right of the soil belongs. The pursuit of Foxes through another's ground is allowed, because
the destruction of such animals is for the public good. And, as the safety of the people is a law
above all others, it is lawful to part affrayers, in the house of another man. Houses may be razed,
to prevent the spreading of fire, because for the public good. We find, indeed, a memorable
instance of folly recorded in the 3 vol. of Clarendon'sHistory, where it is mentioned, that the
Lord Mayor of London, in 1666, when that city was on fire, would not give directions for, or
consent to, the pulling down forty wooden houses, or to removing the furniture, &c. belonging
to the Lawyers of the Temple, then on the circuit, for fear he should be answerable for a
trespass; and in consequence of this conduct half that great city was burnt.
Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357, 363 (Pa. 1788). The current Vermont Constitution contains a
provision that has been intact since 1777: "The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in
seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not enclosed." Vt.
Const. ch. II, § 67. Thus, unless a piece of land in Vermont is enclosed, hunters and fowlers may
enter it at will "to hunt and fowl."
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plenary powers all state governments had during the early years of the
27
republic.
Although the U.S. Constitution does not specifically reference the
police power, the Founders envisioned a federal government actively
exercising police powers within the sphere of its enumeratedpowers.2 8
The Framers considered the police power an essential attribute of
government sovereignty.29 Hamilton propounded this view in the
Federalist Papers:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite
to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and
to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible,
free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to
the sense of the people.3"
27. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins Of
Substantive Due Process, 16 Const. Commentary 315, 324 (1999) (noting that "[t]he newly
independent Americans emphatically rejected the English notion of legislative supremacy in favor of
a limited government"). The federal government was limited; state governments were not.
28. The Necessary and Proper Clause exemplifies the Framers' understanding that the
government would have at least the power to carry out its constitutionally mandated functions. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have the power to... make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.").
29. This is consistent with the Washington tradition. "The police power of the State is an attribute
of sovereignty, an essential element of the power to govern, and this power exists without
declaration, the only limitation upon it being that it must reasonably tend to promote some interest of
the State, and not violate any constitutional mandate." CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 805, 928
P.2d 1054 (1996).
30. The FederalistNo. 31, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton also noted:
Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquires after truth, will serve to convince us
that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined authority in
respect to all those objects which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the
most vigilant and careful attention of the people to see that it be modeled in such a manner as to
admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan which has been, or may
be, offered to our consideration should not, upon a dispassionate inspection, be found to answer
this description, it ought to be rejected. A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit
to be trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any government,
would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the National Interests. Wherever These can with
propriety be confided, the co-incident powers may safely accompany them. This is the true
result of all just reasoning upon the subject.
Id., No. 23, at 156.

Police Power and Property Rights
C.

PolicePower and the Washington Constitution

Washington's Constitution is representative of state constitutions of
the late nineteenth century and a creature of one hundred years of
American constitutional experience. Washington's constitutional framers
in 1889 were also influenced by the outlook of the Progressive
movement of that period.31
Washington's framers understood that the power of state government,
unlike the power of federal government, was plenary, absent
constitutional restrictions.32 Consequently, to inhibit abuse of that
31. The convention mirrored the Progressive politics of the era:
The Washington constitution, as adopted by the convention August 22, 1889, exhibited a
number of features and characteristics that were typical of the political thinking of the day. A
reform mood is evident in the repeated efforts to deal with political corruption, in the wellintentioned, if unwise, attempts to provide safeguards against public extravagance, in a general
distrust of government (even of representative government), and in similar doubts about the
large business corporations which were then becoming so powerful, especially in
manufacturing, transportation, and banking. Reform thinking expressed itself in numerous
prohibitions and restraints which included specific stipulations that the convention might well
have left for future legislatures to prescribe rather than including them in the constitution itself.
When it came to finding protection against public officials who might be guilty of misdeeds,
the answer was to make administrative and judicial officers individually responsible to the
electorate, and to establish procedures for their impeachment or removal, should disciplinary
action become necessary.
Charles M. Gates, Forewordto The Journalofthe Washington State ConstitutionalConvention 1889
iii, vi (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., Book Publishing Co. 1962); see also Robert Utter, Freedom and
Diversityin a FederalSystem: Perspectiveson State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration
ofRights, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 491 (1984).
The Progressive movement marked a new emphasis in American politics on collective action
through government to address the consequences of the post-Civil War industrialization and
urbanization of American life. See generally Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition
(1948). Theodore Roosevelt summarized the essence of the Progressive ideal:
[A] simple and poor society can exist as a democracy on the basis of sheer individualism. But a
rich and complex industrial society cannot so exist; for some individuals, and especially those
artificial individuals called corporations, become so very big that the ordinary individual is
utterly dwarfed beside them, and cannot deal with them on terms of equality. It therefore
becomes necessary for these ordinary individuals to combine in their turn, first in order to act in
their collective capacity through the biggest of all combinations called the government, and
second to act, also in their own self-defense, through private combinations, such as farmers'
associations and trade unions.
Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography257-58 (1958).
32. See Brower v. State, 137 Wash. 2d 44, 55, 969 P.2d 42, 50 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1088
(1999) ("The state constitution is not a grant but rather is a restriction on the law-making power.");
Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wash. 2d 425,431, 353 P.2d 941, 945 (1960) ("mhe power of the legislature to
enact all reasonable laws is unrestrained except where, either expressly or by fair inference, it is
prohibited by the state and federal constitutions.").
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plenary power, the first Article of the Washington Constitution is a
declaration of rights limiting the authority of government over the
individual.33 In the legislative article, Article II, the framers restricted the
plenary power of the legislature as well.34 The legislature could not enact
36
bills containing more than one subject,35 pass special legislation,
37
introduce last-minute bills, amend laws without clearly indicating what
was being amended,38 or adopt non-germane riders to legislation.39 The
taxation and appropriation powers of the legislature,4" as well as the
power to incur debt,4 were limited. The legislature could not lend the
state's credit42 or make gifts of public funds.43
33. See Wash. Const. art. I.
34. See Wash. Const. art. I.
35. See Wash. Const. art. II, § 19 ("No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be
expressed in the title.").
36. Article II, section 28 of the Washington Constitution forbids enactment of a variety of private
or special legislation from name changes to changing county lines. See, e.g., Island County v. State,
135 Wash. 2d 141, 155, 955 P.2d 377, 384 (1998) (invalidating as special legislation act creating
community councils only in counties consisting entirely of islands). Article 11,section 24 in 1889
prohibited lottery bills as well as bills of divorce. Wash. Const. art II, § 24.
37. Article II, section 36 provides:
No bill shall be considered in either house unless the time of its introduction shall have been at
least ten days before the final adjournment of the legislature, unless the legislature shall
otherwise direct by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, said vote to be
taken by yeas and nays and entered upon thejournal, or unless the same be at a special session.
Wash. Const. art. II, § 36.
38. See Wash. Const. art. II, § 37 ("No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to
its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length."). The purpose of
this section is to protect legislators and the public from fraud and deception and make reference to
what is being amended as certain and clear as possible. See Washington Educ. Ass'n v. State, 93
Wash. 2d 37, 40-41, 604 P.2d 950, 952 (1980); Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash.
76, 79, 109 P. 316,318 (1910).
39. See Wash. Const. art. II, § 38 ("No amendment to any bill shall be allowed which shall change
the scope and object of the bill.").
40. The legislature was required to enact general laws for the assessment and levying of taxes on
persons and corporations. See Wash. Const. art. VII, §§ 1-3, 5. The moneys received had to be
placed in the state treasury. See Wash. Const. art VII, § 6. Moneys could be spent only by
appropriation, see Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 4, and had to be annually accounted for by the
legislature, see Wash. Const. art. VII, § 7. The purpose of the appropriation section was
accountability-to prevent expenditures by public officers without express legislative direction. See
State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 172, 162 P. 1, 3 (1917). The legislature could not
surrender or suspend the power to tax corporations. See Wash. Const. art. VII, § 4.
41. See Wash. Const. art. VIII, §§ 1, 3.
42. See Wash. Const. art VIII, § 5 ("The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or
loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation."); see generally Hugh
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Moreover, the framers mistrusted the concentration of executive
power. They provided for an executive branch consisting of eight elected
officials-governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer,
auditor, attorney general, superintendent of public instruction, and
commissioner of public lands-rather than an all-powerful governor
appointing officials to those posts.'
In sum, while Washington's constitutional framers understood the
plenary power of the State, they were sufficiently mistrustful of the
exercise of political power to delineate carefully protected individual
rights in the Constitution, restrict the power of the legislature, and
disperse the executive authority. Were a casual reader of the Washington
Constitution to stop with these observations, the reader might conclude
the Washington Constitution severely restricted governmental power
generally and the police power specifically. Such a conclusion would be
far wide of the mark.
True to their Progressive-era roots, the Washington framers added
prescriptive language to the constitution directing the legislature to create
a vigorous government with expansive authority to exercise police power
to preserve public peace, safety, health, and welfare. A careful inventory
of the constitutional mandates to the legislature to establish
governmental agencies and create governmental programs reveals a state
government remarkable in its scope and authority. The framers mandated
creation of specific government departments, including a bureau of
statistics, agriculture, and immigration within the secretary of state's
office;4 5 a harbor lines commission;' a state board of health and a bureau
48
of vital statistics;4 7 and a railroads and transportation commission. The
Spitzer, An Analytical View of Recent "Lending of Credit" Decisions in Washington State, 8 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 195 (1985).
43. See Wash. Const. art VIII, § 5; see generally King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 133
Wash. 2d 584, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997); CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996);
Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 905,602 P.2d 1177 (1979); David D.
Martin, Washington State Constitutional Limitations on Gifting ofFunds to PrivateEnterprise: A
Needfor Reform, 20 Seattle U. L. Rev. 199 (1996).
IlL§ 1.
44. See Wash. Const.art.
45. See Wash. Const. art. II, § 34 ("There shall be established in the office of the secretary of the
state, a bureau of statistics, agriculture and immigration, under such regulations as the legislature

may provide").
46. See W'ash. Const. art. XV, § 1.
47. See Wash. Const. art. XX, § 1 ("There shall be established by law a state board of health and a
bureau of vital statistics in connection therewith, with such powers as the legislature may direct.").

48. See Wash. Const. art. XIL § 18.
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federal constitution, in contrast, references departments in the executive
branch,4 9 but describes none with specificity.
More important, the framers of the Washington State Constitution
directed the legislature to establish specific governmental programs, in
some instances involving very significant regulatory powers. Local
governments were free to enact such police, sanitary, and other
regulations as were not in conflict with state law. 0 The legislature was to
make ample provision for the education of children by establishing a
public school system including "common schools, and such high schools,
normal schools, and technical schools" as may be necessary.5 The
framers thus envisioned a system of common-school and post-secondary
education as a state constitutional obligation. 2 The Washington
Constitution also directs the legislature to create a soldiers' home, 3 penal
institutions, and facilities for the disabled. 4
49. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
50. See Wash. Const. art. XI, § 11 ("Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce
within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws.").
51. Article IX, Section 2 of the Washington Constitution provides:
The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools. The public
school system shall include common schools, and such high schools, normal schools, and
technical schools as may hereafter be established. But the entire revenue derived from the
common school fund and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the
support of the common schools.
Article IX, Section one states: "It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for
the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account
of race, color, caste, or sex." Wash. Const. art. IX, § I.
These provisions formed the basis for the Supreme Court of Washington holding in Seattle School
Districtv. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978), that the legislature had a con-stitutional duty
to define and fund basic education.
52. Wash. Const. art. IX, § 2.
53. Wash. Const. art. X, § 3.
54. Article XIII, Section one provided:
Educational, reformatory, and penal institutions: those for the benefit of blind, deaf, dumb, or
otherwise defective youth; for the insane or idiotic; and such other institutions as the public
good may require, shall be fostered and supported by the state, subject to such regulations as
may be provided by law. The regents, trustees, or commissioners of all such institutions existing
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, and of such as shall thereafter be established by
law, shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate; and
upon all nominations made by the governor, the question shall be taken by ayes and noes, and
entered upon the journal.
Wash. Const. art. XIII, § 1 (1889).
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In the economic sphere, the framers' directions to the legislature were
dramatic in their scope. The legislature was required to pass work-place
safety legislation for persons "working in mines, factories and other
employments dangerous to life and deleterious to health" and to establish
an enforcement mechanism for such laws."5 The legislature was directed
to regulate corporations generally. 6 The constitution grants the
legislature more specific power to regulate common carriers, including
their conduct of business, 7 rates, 58 relationship to telephone, telegraph,
55. Wash. Const. art. II, § 35 ("The legislature shall pass necessary laws for the protection of
persons working in mines, factories and other employments dangerous to life or deleterious to
health; and fix pains and penalties for the enforcement of the same."); see generally John R. Dick,
Washington Job Safety Legislation, 9 Gonz. L. Rev. 457 (1974); Alan S. Paja, The Washington
IndustrialSafety and Health Act: WISHA's Twentieth Anniversary, 1973-1993, 17 U. Puget Sound
L. Rev. 245 (1994). Even from a purely economic standpoint, government regulatory action may be
necessary to achieve minimal occupational health and safety goals. See generally, e.g., Sidney A.
Shapiro, The Necessity ofOSHA, Kansas J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, Spring 1999, at 22 (1999).
56. Article XI1, Section one provides:
Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special acts. All
laws relating to corporations may be altered, amended or repealed by the legislature at any time,
and all corporations doing business in this state may, as to such business, be regulated, limited
or restrained by law.
Wash. Const. art. XI, § 1; see also Wash. Const. art. XII, §§ 2-12 (permitting regulation of
corporations); see generally James M. Dolliver, Condemnation, Credit, and Corporations in
Washington: 100 Years of JudicialDecisions-Have the Framers' Miews Been Followed? 12 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 163 (1989).
57. Article XI, Section thirteen provides:
All railroad, canal and other transportation companies are declared to be common carriers and
subject to legislative control. Any association or corporation organized for the purpose, under
the laws of this state, shall have the right to connect at the state line with railroads of other
states. Every railroad company shall have the right with its road, whether the same be now
constructed or may hereafter be constructed, to intersect, cross or connect with any other
railroad, and when such railroads are of the same or similar gauge they shall at all crossings and
at all points, where a railroad shall begin or terminate at or near any other railroad, form proper
connections so that the cars of any such railroad companies may be speedily transferred from
one railroad to another. All railroad companies shall receive and transport each the other's
passengers, tonnage and cars without delay or discrimination.
Wash. Const. art. XII, § 13; see also Wash. Const. art. XII, § 14 (prohibiting combinations by
carriers); Wash. Const. art. XII, § 16 (prohibiting consolidation of competing lines).
58. Article XII, Section eighteen provides:
The legislature may pass laws establishing reasonable rates of charges for the transportation of
passengers and freight, and to correct abuses and prevent discrimination and extortion in the
rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the different railroads and other common carriers in the
state, and shall enforce such laws by adequate penalties. A railroad and transportation
commission may be established and its powers and duties fully defined by law.
wash. Const. art. XIL § 18.
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and express companies,59 and even their conduct toward public
officials.6" The legislature was to enact legislation forbidding trusts and
monopolies.6 The State was to regulate tidelands and port facilities,62
even going so far as to assume public ownership of tidelands.63 For
59. Article XII, Section 19 provides:
Any association or corporation, or the lessees or managers thereof, organized for the purpose, or
any individual, shall have the right to construct and maintain lines of telegraph and telephone
within this state, and said companies shall receive and transmit each other's messages without
delay or discrimination and all of such companies are hereby declared to be common carriers
and subject to legislative control. Railroad corporations organized or doing business in this state
shall allow telegraph and telephone corporations and companies to construct and maintain
telegraph lines on and along the rights of way of such railroads and railroad companies, and no
railroad corporation organized or doing business in this state shall allow any telegraph
corporation or company any facilities, privileges or rates for transportation of men or material or
for repairing their lines not allowed to all telegraph companies. The right of eminent domain is
hereby extended to all telegraph and telephone companies. The legislature shall, by general law
of uniform operation, provide reasonable regulations to give effect to this section.
Wash. Const. art. XII,

§ 19; see also Wash. Const. art XII, § 21

(covering express companies).

60. Article XII, Section 20 provides
No railroad or other transportation company shall grant free passes, or sell tickets or passes at a
discount, other than as sold to the public generally, to any member of the legislature, or to any
person holding any public office within this state. The legislature shall pass laws to carry this
provision into effect.
Wash. Const. art. XII, § 20; see also Wash. Const. art. II, §39 (making it illegal for public official to
receive free transportation from a "railroad or other corporation.").
61. Article XII, Section 21 provides:
Monopolies and trusts shall never be allowed in this state, and no incorporated company,
copartnership, or association of persons in this state shall directly or indirectly combine or make
any contract with any other incorporated company, foreign or domestic, through their
stockholders, or the trustees or assignees of such stockholders, or with any copartnership or
association of persons, or in any manner whatever for the purpose of fixing the price or limiting
the production or regulating the transportation of any product or commodity. The legislature
shall pass laws for the enforcement of this section by adequate penalties, and in case of
incorporated companies, if necessary for that purpose, may declare a forfeiture of their
franchises.
Wash. Const. art. XII, §22. This section powerfully expresses the public policy against
concentrations of economic power, constitutionalizing the common law on monopolies and restraints
of trade. See Group Health Co-op. v. King County Med. Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 635, 237 P.2d 737,
763 (1951); see generally Julian C. Dewell & D. Wayne Gittinger, Washington Constitution with
Reference to State Antitrust Laws, 36 Wash. L. Rev. 239 (1961).
62. See Wash. Const. art. XV, §§ 1-2.
63. Article XVII, Section 1 provides:
The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in
the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and
flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable
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individuals, the homestead exemption, forbidding creditors access to
certain debtor assets, was given constitutional status.'
Finally, in the health sphere, the legislature was to invest the state
board of health with such general powers as the legislature saw fit to
grant.' The fiamers, however, specifically directed the legislature to
regulate the practice of medicine and surgery and the sale of drugs and

medicines.'
rivers and lakes: Provided, that this section shall not be construed so as to debar any person from
asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the state.
Wash. Const. art. XVII, § 1; see generally Ralph W. Johnson et al., Public Trust Doctrineand the
CoastalZone Management in Washington State, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 521 (1992).
64. See Wash. Const. art. XIX, § I ("The legislature shall protect by law from forced sale a certain
portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families.").
65. See Wash. Const. art. XX, § 1.
66. See Wash. Const. art. XX, § 2. Public health has historically been a fundamental basis for the
exercise of the police power. See State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 428, 30 P. 729, 730 (1892). Indeed,
subsequent cases have acknowledged exceedingly broad state power to regulate in the public health
sphere. In Spokane County Health Dist. v. Brockett, 120 Wash. 2d 140, 839 P.2d 324 (1992), the
Supreme Court of Washington upheld a local public health district's needle exchange program to
combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. Id. at 155, 839 P.2d at 332. The court noted its policy of liberal
construction of public health statutes, going so far as to state "we have said the subject matter and
expediency of public health disease prevention measures are 'beyond judicial control, except as they
may violate some constitutional right guaranteed to [defendants]."' Id. at 149 (citing Kaul v. City of
Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 621, 277 P.2d 352 (1954)). The Supreme Court of Washington has
upheld the quarantining of individuals in the face of epidemics despite due process constraints. See
City of Seattle v. Cottin, 144 Wash. 572, 258 P. 520 (1927) (smallpox); State ex rel. McBride v.
Superior Ct., 103 Wash. 409, 174 P. 973 (1918) (syphilis). The courts have also upheld mandatory
tuberculosis screening for incoming university students even when students claim a religious belief
against such screening. See State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545
(1952).The legislative power over drugs is extensive. See Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776, 789,
812, 940 P.2d 604 (1997).
As early as 1892, Justice Dunbar viewed regulation of the health professions as an important aspect
of the police power.
In the profession of medicine, as in that of law, so great is the necessity for special
qualifications in the practitioner, and so injurious the consequences likely to result from the
want of it, that the power, of the legislature to prescribe such reasonable conditions as are
calculated to exclude from the profession those who are unfitted to discharge its duties cannot
be doubted.
The practice of medicine and surgery is a vocation that very nearly concerns the comfort, health
and life of every person in the land. Physicians and surgeons have committed to their care the
most important interests, and it is an almost imperious necessity that only persons possessing
skill and knowledge should be permitted to practice medicine and surgery. For centuries the law
has required physicians to possess and exercise skill and learning, for it has muleted in damages
those who pretend to be physicians and surgeons who have neither learning nor skill. It is,
therefore, no new principle of the law that is asserted by our statute, but if it were it would not
condemn the statute, for the statute is an exercise of police power inherent in the state. It is, no
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Far from creating a government devoid of authority to address issues
of public peace, safety, health, and welfare, Washington's constitution
establishes a vigorous state government designed to actively regulate
social and commercial interactions of its citizens. By the terms of the
constitution itself, state government was to be active in the economic
sphere as well as in health, education, and the needs of the disabled. This
active state government was consistent with the pattern of expansive
exercise of police powers undertaken by the territorial government.67
Clearly, Washington framers did not live in a libertarian dream world
devoid of governmental regulation. They expected government, properly
limited to observe and preserve individual rights, to exercise vigorously
the police power where the needs of Washington citizens so required.
Washington case law on the police power reflects this basic
constitutional understanding, contradicting the hazy historical mythology of those who believe late-nineteenth-century American constitutions were proto-libertarian charters.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICE POWER IN FEDERAL LAW
AND IN WASHINGTON LAW SINCE STATEHOOD
A.

FederalLaw

The U.S. Constitution does not specifically describe the police power,
but federal case law has given it structure and content over the years.
Cases before the Civil War largely reflected the limited role the
Constitution entrusted to the federal government regarding state
enactments. Federal courts were reluctant to strike state statutes,
recognizing the states' broad power to govern their citizens.6" Chief
Justice Marshall eloquently expressed the scope of the states' police
power:
[State inspection laws] form a portion of that immense mass of
legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a
one can doubt, of high importance to the community that health, limb and life should not be left
to the treatment of ignorant pretenders and charlatans.
Carey, 4 Wash. at 428, 30 P. at 730 (citations omitted); see also State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191, 71
P. 737 (1903) (concerning regulation of barbers); Fox v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 297, 5 P. 603
(1884) (deciding regulation of practice of medicine does not violate Fourteenth Amendment).
67. See generally Philip A. Talmadge, Listen Up, Libertarians:The Past Was Not So Different,
Law & Politics, Sept. 1998, at 29 (discussing detailed regulatory laws of Washington Territory).
68. See, e.g., New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
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State, not surrendered to the general government: all which can be
most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as
laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those
which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of
this mass.
No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress;
and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation.69
Even before the Civil War, federal courts recognized "[t]he
suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among
the most important duties of government."7 In discussing the scope of
the states' police power, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded:
The object of all well-regulated governments is to promote the
public good, and to secure the public safety; and the powers of that
legislation necessarily extends to all those objects; and unless,
therefore, in any particular case the power is given to the general
government, it necessarily still remains in the states.7'
With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which imposed
federal due process law on the states, federal-court involvement with
state enactments grew. Turning sharply from the pre-Civil War
atmosphere, in which due process of law was of little constitutional
significance,72 the U.S. Supreme Court began to examine and frequently
strike down state regulations. In the Slaughter-House Cases,' which
marked the beginning of this activist trend, the Court narrowly upheld a
Louisiana law granting a corporation exclusive rights to operate facilities
for the slaughter of livestock.74 The Court found the law a valid exercise
of the state's essential police power.7' Recognizing the importance of this
power, the Court wrote that "[u]pon [the state's police power] depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort
69. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 203 (1824).
70. Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168 (1850) (mem.) (upholding Virginia's law prohibiting
lotteries and sale of lottery tickets).
71. Miln, 36 U.S. at 128.
72. See J.A.C. Grant, The NaturalLaw BackgroundofDue Process,31 Colum. L. Rev. 56,65-66
(1931).
73. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id. at 62.
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of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of
private and social life, and the beneficial use of property."76
Justice Field's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases argued the
regulation interfered with the Louisiana butchers' freedom of contract."
Field's dissent is widely recognized as the first articulation of the
doctrine of substantive due process, later adopted in U.S. Supreme Court
cases such as Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Minnesota,78 Allgeyer v.
Louisiana,79 Coppage v. Kansas,80 Hammer v. Dagenhart,81 and New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. 2
The most infamous of these substantive due process decisions was
Lochner v. New York, 3 in which the Court struck down a New York law
setting maximum work hours for bakers. 84 Despite evidence of the health
hazards posed to bakers working long hours in poorly ventilated
bakeries, the Court concluded the law unreasonably interfered with the
bakers' freedom of contract." According to the Court, the maximumhour law exceeded the limit of the state's police power: "There is, in our
judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or
appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health ....6 Rather
than relying on the state's judgment, the Court substituted its own
judgment and declared the law unconstitutional.8 7 This case gave rise to
the phrase "the Lochner era," which refers to the approximately forty
years of U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating state laws intended to
76. Id.
77. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
78. 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (striking down Minnesota law establishing commission to set railroad
rates).
79. 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down Louisiana statute prohibiting residents from doing
business with New York life insurance company).
80. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down Kansas statute that prohibited unionizing in employment
contracts).
81. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding unconstitutional federal statute prohibiting interstate commerce
in products of child labor).
82. 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (striking down Oklahoma law requiring ice manufacturers to obtain
certification).
83. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
84. See id. at 64-65.
85. See id. at 60-61.
86. Id. at 58.
87. See id. at 64.
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remedy oppressive employment practices and otherwise regulate state
economic affairs.
The tide turned once again, however, with West Coast Hotel Co. v.
8 in which the U.S. Supreme
Parrish,"
Court upheld Washington State's
minimum-wage law for women.89 In West CoastHotel, the Court seemed
to return to its pre-Civil War deference to state regulations passed under
the police power. The Court specifically recognized liberty of contract
did not preclude legislative supervision of contractual activities, nor
denied the government the power to provide restrictive safeguards.90 The
state legislature "has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that
there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace and
good order may be promoted .... ."9" The Court declined to second-guess
the legislative determinations behind the minimum-wage law,
noting "'with the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or
practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both
incompetent and unauthorized to deal ....
.""' The Court concluded the
Washington legislature "is primarily the judge of the necessity of such an
enactment ...and that though the court may hold views inconsistent
with the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled unless palpably in
excess of legislative power."93
Federal court involvement in state economic regulation has remained
limited since West Coast Hotel. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that states may interfere "wherever the public interests demand it" and
continues to afford states considerable deference as to both the decision
to legislate and the specific measures adopted.94 The modem court has
turned away due process challenges to economic regulation with a broad
"hands off' approach. No such law has been invalidated on substantive
due process grounds since 1937.' 5 Federal courts uphold state regulations
as valid exercises of the police power if the measures bear a reasonable
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
See id. at 400.
See id at 395-96.
I at 393.
Id. at 398 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1935)).

93. Id.
94. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
95. Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, ConstitutionalLaw 482-83 (13th ed. 1997).
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relationship 6to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
9
capricious.
A deferential federal review of the police power was expressed by
97
Justice Douglas in Berman v. Parker:
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless,
for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is
essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to
the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor
historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In
such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of
the public needs to be served by social legislation ....
98
B.

Washington Law

Although Washington's Constitution does not specifically enumerate
or define the police power state government may employ, Washington
case law reflects the basic understanding that government can regulate
the social interactions of its citizens. Washington courts have considered
the scope of state police power since the early 1890s. The earliest cases
dealing with the scope of the police power in Washington generally
upheld statutes and ordinances as valid exercises of police power, with
very limited discussion of the parameters of this power. 99 Those cases
illustrate, however, the court's early recognition that "[t]he legislature is
itself primarily the judge of how far police restrictions shall go."'' t
The Supreme Court of Washington's first real discussion of the scope
of the police power came in State v. Buchanan,' a case decided three
96. See West CoastHotel, 300 U.S. at 398.
97. 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
98. Id. at 32.
99. See generally, e.g., State v. Considine, 16 Wash. 358, 47 P. 755 (1897) (upholding law
prohibiting employment of women in saloons); Wilson v. Beyers, 5 Wash. 303, 32 P. 90 (1892)
(upholding law directing marshals to seize stock running at large in streets); City of Olympia v.
Mann, 1 Wash. 389, 25 P. 337 (1890) (upholding fire ordinance prohibiting construction of wooden
buildings). But see Askarn v. King County, 9 Wash. 1, 36 P. 1097 (1894) (striking down law
providing for drainage of swamps without compensating owner of land).
100. State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628, 632, 69 P. 372, 373 (1902) (upholding law prohibiting
conduct of business on Sunday).
101. 29 Wash. 602, 70 P. 52 (1902).

880
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years before Lochner. In Buchanan, the court upheld a law prohibiting
the employment of females for more than ten hours a day. 2 The court
defined the police power as "that power which enables the state to
promote and protect the health, welfare, and safety of society ....'3
The court specifically recognized the difficulty of defining the scope of
the state's police power, and suggested changing conditions of society
would make a change in the administration of government "absolutely
necessary."'"
In a more thorough examination of the scope of the police power,"°5
the court upheld a law requiring assessments according to surface area
for the cost of filling low lands." Filling in the private property was
necessary because municipal improvements had created unsanitary
conditions. 7 The court again noted the difficulty of defining the scope
of the police power, but concluded that the states had such power:
Incapability of definition, however, does not destroy the right of
the public to safeguard property, insure the general health, protect
the morals, preserve the peace, or compel the use of property
consistent with surrounding conditions by the exercise of arbitrary
power and in disregard of the primary right of the individual ....
Its exercise in proper cases marks the growth and development of
the law rather than, as some assert, a tyrannical assertion of
governmental powers denied by our written constitutions.' 8
In upholding the ordinance, the court concluded the right of property is
"a legal right ...and it must be measured always by reference to the
09
rights of others and of the public."'
The court also recognized municipalities could promote public health
through the exercise of the police power. In Shepard v. City ofSeattle,"0
the court upheld a law requiring hospitals harboring persons with
infectious or contagious diseases to connect with the public sewer
102. See a at610, 70 P. at54.
103. IM at 604-05, 70 P. at 52.
104. Id at 610, 70 P. at 54.
105. See Bowes v. City of Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 109 P. 369 (1910).
106. See id at 549, 109 P.2d at 374.

107. See id at 538, 109 P.2d at 370.
108. Id. at 542, 109 P. at371.

109. Id
110. 59 Wash. 363, 109 P. 1067 (1910).
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system."' According to the court, the law was reasonable in light of the
city's power to preserve the public health and safety." The Washington
court also upheld a municipal ordinance regulating the frequency of
street-car service as a valid exercise of police power."' "In its broadest
acceptation [the police power] means the general power of the state to
preserve 4and promote the public welfare, even at the expense of private
rights":"

The police power to regulate comprehends all necessary and
convenient regulations designed to protect life or limb or to
promote the comfort of the public in the use of the streets and
thoroughfares. Not only does such power exist, but the duty to
exercise it is imposed as a solemn obligation upon the municipal
authorities. 5
The idea that the scope of the police power has expanded beyond its
original meaning emerged during the first decades of this century. The
Supreme Court of Washington acknowledged the definition of police
power was not only elusive, but was necessarily tied to the social and
economic conditions in which it was exercised. For example, in State ex
rel. Webster v. Superior Court of King County,"6 Justice Chadwick
opined, "[f]ormerly applied strictly and directly, [the police power] has
now, because of changed economic conditions, come to be more favored,
and is frequently relied
upon to sustain laws which but indirectly affect
'"1 7
good."
common
the
Justice Chadwick revisited his theory of the changing and expanding
scope of state police power in State v. Mountain Timber Co.," 8 a case
111. See id. at 375, 109P.2dat 1071.
112. See id. ("[E]very citizen holds his property subject to a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the state.").
113. See City of Tacoma v. Boutelle, 61 Wash. 434, 112 P. 661 (1911).
114. Id. at 444, 112 P. at 664 (citing Karasek v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 61 P. 33 (1900)).
115. Id. at445, 112P. at665.
116. 67 Wash. 37, 120 P. 861 (1912).
117. Id. at40, 112P. at862.
118. 75 Wash. 581, 135 P. 645 (1913). The dissent in Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d
678, 958 P.2d 273 (1998), cited both Mountain Timber and Boutelle for the proposition that the
scope of the police power has been expanded beyond its original meaning. See Weden at 727-28,
958 P.2d at 298 (Sanders. J., dissenting). Attempts to confine the police power to original meaning
are inherently flawed because they do not take into account the progress of civilization.
Washington's constitutional framers in 1889 could not have possibly conceived of something like
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upholding Washington's Industrial Insurance Act. The court noted the
scope of police power "is not a rule; it is an evolution:" 9
The scope of the police power is to be measured by the legislative
will of the people upon questions of public concern, not in acts
passed in response to sporadic impulses or exuberant displays of
emotion, but in those enacted in affirmance of established usage or
of such standards of morality and expediency as have by gradual
processes and accepted reason become so fixed as to fairly indicate
the better will20of the people in their social, industrial and political
development.
The court indicated Washington law on the police power evidenced a
"growth in [its] liberal interpretation.'' The court's interpretation of the
police power as a flexible and evolving concept raises the question of
whether the historical understanding of the police power is even relevant
to a determination of the proper scope of the police power today."
Even at the beginning of this century, however, the Supreme Court of
Washington did not give the state free reign to do whatever it pleased
under the guise of its police power. It seemed to be particularly important
to the court that the exercise of police power serve some public purpose.
For example, in Conger v. Pierce County," the court ordered a jury trial
on the issue of requiring the state to pay for damages caused by stateauthorized changes and improvements to the Puyallup River.'24 The
improvements allegedly eroded the plaintiff's property." The court
rejected the state's argument that its exercise of the police power
exempted it from paying damages' 26 and criticized the lack of a public
27
purpose.
pornography on the Internet. Does that mean there is today no police power in a library district to
control children's access to the Internet on library computers?
119. Mountain Timber, 75 Wash. at 588, 135 P. at 648.
120. lId at 588-89, 135 P. at 648-49.
121. Id at 585, 135 P.2d at 647.
122. But see Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 724, 958 P. at 296 (1998) (Sanders, J., dissenting) (stating
that original understanding of police power "relevant subject of inquiry").
123. l16 Wash. 27, 198P.377(1921).
124. See id.at 42, 198 P.2d at 382.
125. See id.at 30, 198 P.2d at 378.
126. See id at40, 198 P. at381.
127. See id at 38, 198 P. at 381; see also Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 88
Wash. 2d 726, 733, 565 P.2d 1162, 1165 (1977) (finding regulation prohibiting construction of
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The Washington court attempted to define the outer limits of the
State's police power in City of Seattle v. Ford,28 a case in which the
court struck down an ordinance prohibiting "hawking."' 29 While the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power as to streets and public
places, the court held that prohibiting hawking on private property
exceeded the state's power. 3 "The legislature may not, under the guise
of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private
business or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations."'' The court articulated a two-part test for determining
whether the state was justified in interposing its authority on behalf of
the public: (1) "that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished

from those of a particular class, require such interference"; and (2) "that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."'3
In evaluating statutes passed under the rubric of the state's police
power, the Washington court has consistently demonstrated great
deference to the legislature's judgment.' This deference extends both to
the determination of interests justifying the regulation, and the means
used to serve these interests.' 34 For example, the Washington court has
held it need not find that facts justifying a law passed under the police
power actually exist.'35 If the court can reasonably conceive of a set of
facts justifying the legislation, the court "must presume" those facts exist
human dwellings within flood control zone was valid exercise of police power because of public
concern for protection of public health and safety).
128. 144 Wash. 107, 257 P. 243 (1927).
129. Id. at 115, 257 P.2d at 245. "Hawking" was defined as selling anything (except newspapers)
by public outcry, musical or other entertainment, ringing bells, whistles, or horns. Id. at 108, 257 P.
at 243.
130. See id. at 115,257P. at245.
131. Id. at 112,257 P. at 244-45.
132. Id. at 112, 257 P. at 244. The Supreme Court of Washington in 1936 articulated a slightly
different test for evaluating laws passed under the state's police power. The court held the only
limitation upon the police power was that "it must reasonably tend to correct some evil or promote
some interest of the state, and not violate any direct or positive mandate of the constitution." Shea v.
Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615, 619 (1936). This expression succinctly states the plenary
nature of the police power. See CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 805, 928 P.2d 1054, 1065
(1996); Markham Adver. Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405,421-22,439 P.2d 248, 258 (1968).
133. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 691, 958 P.2d 273, 279-80 (1998);
McDermott v. State, 197 Wash. 79, 83-84, 84 P.2d 372, 374 (1938).
134. See Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 691, 958 P.2d at 279-80; McDermott, 197 Wash. at 83, 84 P.2d
at 374.
135. See Shea, 185 Wash. at 154, 53 P.2d at 620.
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and the law was passed for that purpose.'36 The court's inquiry focuses
only on any subversion of constitutionally guaranteed rights.' 3 7 If the
regulation serves a legitimate public purpose, "its wisdom or necessity is
a matter left exclusively to the legislative body."' 3 8 In fact, the enactment
is valid unless challengers can show it to be arbitrary and capricious
beyond a reasonable doubt.'39
When examining state regulations passed under its police power, the
Washington court currently applies a test similar to that articulated in
Ford and in other cases from the early part of this century. A valid
exercise of the police power must promote the health, safety, morals,
welfare, education, or peace of the general public."4 Additionally, the
136. Id.; see also City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d 583, 592, 919 P.2d 1218, 1223
(1996).
137. See Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, 10 Wash. 2d 372, 374, 116 P.2d 756, 758 (1941), overruled on othergrounds by Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 55 Wash. 2d 1,345 P.2d 1085 (1959).
138. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d at 592, 919 P.2d at 1223. As the court stated in Homes Unlimited,
Ina v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 154, 159, 579 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1978), "the wisdom, necessity
and expediency of the law are not for judicial determination," and an enactment may not be struck
down as beyond the police power unless it "is shown to be clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious." lId
139. See Convention Ctr. Coalition v. City of Seattle, 107 Wash. 2d 370, 377-78, 730 P.2d 636,
641-42 (1986).
140. The Washington court stated in State v. Crediford, 130 Wash. 2d 747, 752, 927 P.2d 1129,
1131 (1996): "[a] legislative enactment is presumed constitutional and the party challenging it bears
the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." A party asserting a statute
exceeds the State's police power must overcome the presumption that "it (1) tends to correct some
evil or promote some interest of the State, and (2) bears a reasonable and substantial relationship to
accomplishing its purpose." State v. Brayman, 110 Wash. 2d 183, 193, 751 P.2d 294 (1988) (citing
State v. Conifer Enters., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 94, 96-97, 508 P.2d 149, 151 (1973)); see also Weden v.
San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d, 678, 700, 958 P.2d 273, 284 (1998); State ex rel. Faulk v. CSG Job
Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 493,504, 816 P.2d 725, 731 (1991).
A listing of the types of government action held to be within the police power by Washington
courts is instructive. See generally, e.g., Development Servs. of Am., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 138
Wash. 2d. 107, 979 P.2d 387 (1999) (restricting business use of helipads); Weden, 135 Wash. 2d
678, 958 P.2d 273 (banning jetskis); Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 617 P.2d 713
(1980) (establishing rent controls for floating homes); Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929,
481 P.2d 9 (1971) (involving fire protection ordinance); Markham Adver. Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d
405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968) (regulating outdoor advertising signs); Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash.
2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964) (requiring fencing around vehicle wrecking yards); City of Bellingham
v. Schampera, 57 Wash. 2d 106, 356 P.2d 292 (1960) (considering driving while intoxicated law);
Brown v. City of Seattle, 150 Wash. 203, 272 P. 517 (1928) (regulating meat markets); City of
Seattle v. Ford, 144 Wash. 107, 257 P. 243 (1927) (regulating street hawking); Detamore v. Hindley,
83 Wash. 322, 145 P. 462 (1915) (involving ordinance setting bridge-viaduct construction
standards); State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 P. 645 (1913) (considering worker
compensation law); City of Tacoma v. Boutelle, 61 Wash. 434, 112 P. 661 (1911) (regulating
frequency of street car service); Bowes v. City of Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 109 P. 369 (1910)
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police power measure must serve its purpose by means that are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of that purpose. 4 ' Courts
broadly construe the police power and place on the party challenging the
validity of a statute the burden of proving a regulation exceeds the proper
scope of the power.'4 2
As to the first question, whether the police power regulation promotes
the interests of the general public, the Washington court has recognized a
wide variety of interests as justifying the exercise of the police power.
Interest in protecting and conserving natural resources is one example.'43
In Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake,'" the court also held considerations of attractiveness and beauty in surrounding conventional
architecture are appropriate concerns when planning for the general
welfare. The court therefore upheld, as a valid exercise of police power, a
zoning ordinance prohibiting the placement of mobile homes in a singlefamily residence zone.'45 Similarly, promoting the convenience and
enjoyment of public travel, protecting the public investment in highways,
attracting visitors to the state, and conserving the natural beauty of the
area are valid public purposes justifying regulations on outdoor
advertising.' 46 Matters of economic justice are interests within the police
power as well.'47
(filling of low-lying marsh land against owner's will at owner's expense); State v. Buchanan, 29
Wash. 602, 70 P. 52 (1902) (limiting work day for women to ten hours); State v. Nichols, 28 Wash.
628, 69 P. 372 (1902) (forbidding business on Sundays); Hathaway v. McDonald, 27 Wash. 659, 68
P. 376 (1902) (involving regulation of renovated butter).
141. See Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 691, 700, 958 P.2d at 279-80, 284.
142. See CSG Job Cr., 117 Wash. 2d at 503, 816 P.2d at 731.
143. See State v. Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551, 556, 202 P.2d 906, 907 (1949). This power has been
described as "plenary" in the protection of wildlife. See State v. Satiacum, 50 Wash. 2d 513, 520,
314 P.2d 400, 404 (1957).
Under the common law of England, all property in animals ferae naturae was in the sovereign
for the use and benefit of the people. This law was carried to the colonies and ultimately to this
state. We have cases which rest the state's authority to regulate fish and game upon the state's
proprietary right therein, as well as upon the police power.
State Dep't of Fisheries v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 91 Wash. 2d 378, 382, 588 P.2d 1146, 1149
(1979).
144. 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).
145. See id. at 34-35, 586 P.2d at 870-71.
146. See Markham Adver. Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 422, 439 P.2d 248, 260 (1968).
147. In the landmark case Parrishv. West Coast Hotel Co., the Washington court quoted with
approval the language Chief Justice William Howard Taft used in an earlier dissent:
Legislatures in limiting freedom of contract between employee and employer by a minimum wage
proceed on the assumption that employees, in the class receiving least pay, are not upon a full level
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The second prong of the court's police power analysis looks at
whether the means used bear a reasonable and substantial relation to the

public interest or general welfare.'4 8 To uphold an act as a valid exercise
of police power, the court must conclude there is a rational connection
between the statute's purpose and the method used to achieve that

purpose.'49 A valid exercise of the police power will be upheld even if it

causes economic hardship to individuals. 5 0
As early as 1921, the Supreme Court of Washington understood the

police power was designed to regulate use of property.'

Recently, in

52

Christiansonv. Snohomish Health District, the court noted, "since the
of equality of choice with their employer and in their necessitous circumstances are prone to accept
pretty much anything that is offered. They are peculiarly subject to the overreaching of the harsh and
greedy employer. The evils of the sweating system and of the long hours and low wages which are
characteristic of it are well known.
Parrish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 185 Wash. 581, 585, 55 P.2d 1083 (1936) (quoting Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (Taft, CJ., dissenting), overruledby West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)), afj'd, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
148. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678,701,958 P.2d 273,284(1998).
149. See State ex rel.Faulk v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 493, 506, 816 P.2d 725, 732 (1991).
150. See, e.g., Bitts, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash. 2d 395, 400, 544 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1976)
("Economic hardship cannot usually be urged as a reason for the invalidity of an otherwise valid
statute or ordinance enacted under the police power."); Wiegardt v. Brennan, 192 Wash. 529, 537,
73 P.2d 1330s 1333 (1937) ("It frequently happens that regulatory laws, enacted under the police
power in furtherance of some appropriate purpose, impose hardship in individual cases, due to
special and peculiar circumstances; but this fact will not subject the law to constitutional
objection.").
151. See Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921).
It is easy to understand the principles upon which the police power doctrine is based, but
difficult to define in language its limitations. It is not inconsistent with nor antagonistic to the
rules of law concerning the taking of private property for a public use. Because of its elasticity
and the inability to define or fix its exact limitations, there is sometimes a natural tendency on
the part of the courts to stretch this power in order to bridge over otherwise difficult situations,
and for like reasons it is a power most likely to be abused. It has been defined as an inherent
power in the state which permits it to prevent all things harmful to the comfort, welfare and
safety of society. It is based on necessity. It is exercised for the benefit of the public health,
peace and welfare. Regulating and restricting the use of private property in the interest of the
public is its chief business. It is the basis of the idea that the private individual must suffer
without other compensation than the benefit to be received by the general public. It does not
authorize the taking or damaging of private property in the sense used in the constitution with
reference to taking such property for a public use. Eminent domain takes private property for a
public use, while the police power regulates its use and enjoyment, or if it takes or damages it, it
is not a taking or damaging for the public use, but to conserve the safety, morals, health and
general welfare of the public.
lt at 35-36, 198 P. at 380.
152. 133 Wash. 2d 647,946 P.2d 768 (1997).
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police power is inherent in the effective conduct and maintenance of
government, it is to be upheld even though it adversely effects [sic] the
property rights of some individuals."' 53
Washington case law belies the assertion that the early conception of
the power to regulate land was limited to the state's power to suppress
nuisances." Nor was the state's power to act under the police power
limited to those acts taken to protect the general public from harm.
Washington case law in this area rests upon the basic understanding that
the state can legitimately regulate the lives of its citizens through the
exercise of its police power. "While there are limits to the police power,
the use of police power by government allows the Legislature to enact
laws in the interest of the people."' 55 The Washington court continues to
show considerable deference to the legislative body's definition of
public interest and to its choice of means by which to serve that interest.
III.

LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

As noted, the exercise of police power under the U.S. and Washington
Constitutions is expansive and largely co-extensive with the power of
government itself. This is not to say, however, this power is unlimited.
Both constitutions contain significant limitations on the exercise of
police power by state government in their eminent-domain and Due
Process Clauses. Further, state and federal case law expanded those
limits to encompass inverse condemnation and regulatory takings, as
well as substantive due process. Washington case law on substantive due
process is especially broad in scope.
A.

Takings as a Limitation on Police Power

The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its Washington State
counterpart traditionally constituted a limitation on police power where
the government regulation deprived the owner of the property or its
essential value.'56 Yet these provisions are traditionally compensation
153. Id. at 664, 946 P.2d at 776 (1997).
154. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d at 728, 958 P.2d at 298 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
155. Id. at 691, 958 P.2d at 279.
156. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. Amend. V. The Washington Constitution
contains a more expansive eminent-domain clause:
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directives-government must pay property owners if government takes
property. More extreme property-rights advocates argue for a new
Takings Clause as a means to invalidate government
concept of the
57
enactments.1
In its purest form, the Takings Clause prevents the State from

expropriating private property without paying compensation to the
property owner. "A per se taking occurs whenever government causes its

agents or the public to regularly use or permanently occupy property
known to be in private ownership."' 8 While recognizing the
government's inherent power of eminent domain,'5 9 the Takings Clause
conditions the exercise of the power upon the payment of just

compensation.
Over the course of this century, the Takings Clause expanded to

protect private-property owners not only from the state's physical
occupation of their land, but also from excessive state regulations
operating to reduce its value."6 Courts concluded that takings could be in
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of necessity, and for
drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary
purposes. No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just
compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the owner, and no right-of-way
shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than municipal until full compensation
therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of
any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be
ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in courts of record, in the
manner prescribed by law. Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a
judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use
is public: Provided, that the taking of private property by the state for land reclamation and
settlement purposes is hereby declared to be for public use.
Wash. Const. art. 1, § 16; see generally William Ronald Hulen, Abusive Exercises of the Power of
EminentDomain-Takinga Look at What the Taker Took 44 Wash. L. Rev. 200 (1968).
157. See generallyEpstein, supranote 2.
158. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 670, 747 P.2d 1062, 1088 (1987) (citing Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,427 n.5 (1982)).
159. See State ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle, 46 Wash. 2d 166, 168, 279 P.2d 645, 647 (1955).
160. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding regulation
that goes too far will be recognized as taking). The U.S. Supreme Court originally rejected the theory
that the Takings Clause required just compensation to be paid to landowners when the state's
exercise of police power diminished the value of their property. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
668-69 (1887); see generally Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Takings Doctrinein Washington: Now
You See it,
Now You Don 't, 12 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 339 (1989).
A regulatory taking is evaluated in light of several factors: (1) the character of the government
action; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct, investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the economic impact of the regulation. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
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6
the form of not only physical appropriation, but also overregulation.1 1
The relevant question then became whether the regulation decreased the
value of the land. If the regulation was so oppressive it deprived the
landowner of all economically viable use of the land, the land had been
"taken" and just compensation was due. 62
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that "[p]olice power
actions limiting the use of private property can constitute a de facto
exercise of eminent domain requiring just compensation." ' 63 For
example, Martin v. Port of Seattle'64 involved landowners complaining
about the noise and vibrations from aircraft.'65 The trial court ordered just
compensation for one group of plaintiffs because the low overhead
flights amounted to a taking of an easement and the noise amounted to a
damaging of the property.1 66 The Supreme Court of Washington
specifically rejected the argument that there was no just compensation
due to those plaintiffs whose land was not damaged by flights passing
directly over their property.'67 In doing so, the court moved away from
notions of physical trespass, ouster of possession, and what the court
68
called "the overly strict interpretation of 'taking."

[T]his court will not ...stress any of the proposed distinctions
between the "taking" and the "damaging" of a property right
respecting the use and enjoyment of the land. As the Washington
Constitution affords or provides a basis for compensation in either
instance, subtle efforts at legal refinement to characterize and
describe a particular interference can be expected to be more
difficult and treacherous than convincing or utilitarian.'6 9
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The second factor may be decisive and inhibit recovery where
a person purchases property with knowledge of the restraint, because the market has likely
discounted the value of the property for the restraint. This factor is still valid after Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 133 (1992). See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
161. See Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992).
162. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 335, 787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990).
163.
164.
165.
166.

Orion Corp., 109 Wash. 2d at 645, 747 P.2d at 1074.
64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964).
See id. at 310-11, 391 P.2d at 542.
See id. at 319-20, 391 P.2d at 547.

167. See id. at 316, 391 P.2d at 545.
168. Id. at317, 391 P.2dat546.
169. Id. at 313, 391 P.2d at 543; see also Cummins v. King County, 72 Wash. 2d 624, 628, 434
P.2d 588, 590-91 (1967).
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When the state usurps private-property interests without exercising its
eminent-domain powers, landowners can seek redress through inversecondemnation actions. "Inverse condemnation is the popular description
of an action brought against a governmental entity having the power of
eminent domain to recover the value of property which has been
appropriated in fact, but with no formal exercise of the power."'70 "A
party alleging inverse condemnation must establish the following
elements: (1) a taking or damaging (2) of private property (3) for public
use (4) without just compensation being paid (5) by a governmental
entity that has not instituted formal proceedings...' The judicial
determination of whether the taking has occurred for a public use and
whether compensation is due thus follows, rather than precedes, the
government action.
Before analyzing whether a government regulation constitutes a
taking, Washington courts engage in a threshold inquiry to determine
whether takings analysis applies.17 The first step in this process is to
determine whether the regulation "destroys or derogates any fundamental
attribute of property ownership; including the right to possess; to exclude
others: or to dispose of property."'73 Where a landowner alleges physical
invasion or the denial of all economically viable use of the property, the
court need not consider the second part of the threshold inquiry. 74
Instead, the burden shifts to the State to prove common law principles of
property and nuisance prohibit the landowner's proposed uses.'75 If the
State cannot demonstrate the economically viable use denied by the
170. Martin, 64 Wash. 2d at 310 n.1, 391 P.2d at 542 n.1 (citing Thomburg v. Port of Portland,
376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962)).
171. Phillips v. King County, 136 Wash. 2d 946, 957, 968 P.2d 871, 876 (1998); see generally
Reginald Cullitan, Inverse Condemnation in Washington State: A Survey of Judicial History
Defining Public Rights in PrivateProperty, 16 Gonz. L. Rev. 385 (1981); Kim Pflueger, Takings
Law-Is Inverse Condemnationan AppropriateRemedy for Due Process Violations?San Diego Gas
and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), 57 Wash. L. Rev. 551 (1982).
172. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 594-95, 854 P.2d 1, 5 (1993). This threshold
inquiry is especially important when, as is often the case, a regulation is challenged as both a taking
and a due process violation.
173. Id. at 602, 854 P.2d at 10; see also Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49, 830
P.2d 318, 328 (1992).
174. See Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 601, 854 P.2d at 9.

175. See idat 602, 854 P.2d at 10; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1029-30 (1992).
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regulation was already barred by existing common-law principles of
property and nuisance, the landowner is entitled to just compensation.' 76
When a landowner alleges less than physical invasion or a total taking,
courts must continue with the second step of the threshold inquiry in
order to determine whether takings analysis applies. The second question
considers "whether the challenged regulation protects the public interest
in health, safety, the environment or fiscal integrity."'7 7 This question
focuses on whether the regulation prevents public harm, as opposed to
requiring the landowner to provide an affirmative public benefit. If a
regulation provides a public benefit rather than preventing public harm,
or if it infringes upon a fundamental attribute of ownership, courts
proceed with the takings analysis. 7 ' The purpose behind this threshold
inquiry is "to prevent undue chilling on legislative bodies' attempts to
properly and carefully structure land use regulations which prevent
179
public harm."'
In determining whether a state's exercise of police power constitutes a
taking, Washington courts first consider whether the regulation
substantially advances legitimate state interests.8 0 If a regulation
destroys a fundamental aspect of ownership without serving a legitimate
public interest, the regulation is a per se taking.' On the other hand, if
the regulation does serve a legitimate public purpose, the court balances
the state's interests against the impact of the regulation on the landowner,
specifically considering the economic impact of the regulation, the
extent of the property owner's investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action.'
The remedy for a taking is just compensation-the government must
pay the property owner for the state's interference with the owner's
rights. ' 3 The measure of recovery is the injury to the market value of the
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 600, 602-03, 854 P.2d at 10.
Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49, 830 P.2d at 318.
See Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 603-04, 854 P.2d at 11.
Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992).

180. See, e.g., Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 595, 854 P.2d at 6; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830
P.2d at 318; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 663, 747 P.2d 1062, 1084-85 (1987).
181. See Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830 P.2d at 328.
182. See Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 604, 854 P.2d at 9 (citing Presbytery of Seattle v. King
County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 335-36, 787 P.2d 907, 915(1990)).
183. See Orion Corp., 109 Wash. 2d at 648 n.18, 747 P.2d at 1077 n.18 (noting that remedy for
taking is just compensation while remedy for due process violation may be invalidation of statute).
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property."8 A new cause of action may accrue "with each measurable or
provable decline in market value." ' 5 In addition, even if the regulation is
eventually invalidated, courts can require just compensation be paid for
the time the public had use of the land while the regulation remained in
effect.'86 Relevant considerations in determining the extent of the
economic harm caused by the government's action include the economic
deprivation caused by the denial of any profitable use and the extent to
which the denial of profitable use interfered with reasonable, investmentbacked expectations.' 87
Because the remedy for a taking is just compensation, the Takings
Clause operates only as an indirect limitation on the exercise of the
police power. That is, the Takings Clause merely imposes a financial
burden upon the state when its exercise of police power deprives a
landowner of the value of his land. 88 "The basic understanding of the
[Fifth] Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking."' 89 A valid exercise of the police power may,
however, place restrictions on a landowner's property rights without
paying just compensation.' Requiring just compensation where a taking
occurs simply prevents the government from forcing individuals to bear
burdens that should, in fairness, be borne by the public as a whole.'9 '
The takings extremists, however, would utilize the federal and state
takings clauses as weapons to invalidate social legislation. 92 Rather than
view the total effect of a government action on property, these advocates
would sift through the "bundle of sticks," contending any government
184. See Phillips v. King County, 136 Wash. 2d 946, 956-57, 968 P.2d 871, 876 (1998); Martin
v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 319, 391 P.2d 540, 548 (1964); Chelan Elec. Co. v. Perry, 148
Wash. 353, 358, 268 P. 1040, 1042 (1928).
185. Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wash. 2d 6, 15, 548 P.2d 1085, 1091
(1976).
186. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987) (establishing temporary takings); Orion Corp., 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077.
187. See Orion Corp., 109 Wash. 2d at 664, 747 P.2d at 1085.

188. See Williamson County Reg'i Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194
(1985).
189. FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 315.
190. See Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400,408,348 P.2d 664, 668-69 (1960).
191. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
192. See generallyEpstein, supranote 2.
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action impacting a use of property was not only compensable, but
93
invalidatedthe government action in its entirety.
In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has employed the Takings
Clause to overturn social legislation, signaling a shift in its jurisprudence
and evidencing a return to the Lochner era. The ultimate effect of this
new trend remains to be seen. In the words of Professor Philip Weinberg
of St. John University School of Law,
The United States Supreme Court has launched an assault on
state and local land use controls in recent years, using the
regulatory takings doctrine of the Constitution as its battering ram
....This unwarranted inflation of the venerable takings rules is a
reprise of the... same judicial strong-arming of legislation designed to curb economic abuses that damaged the Nation in past
decades. As with the straining of due process to invalidate
legislation regulating working conditions and prices, the current
abuse of takings doctrine appears to be similarly driven by a
determination to infuse the Constitution with economic doctrines
94
that should be irrelevant to constitutional law. 1
In sum, the Takings Clauses have expanded as a limitation on the
exercise of police power. From indirect limitations on police powerrequirements that government pay property owners for property takenthey have transformed into mechanisms for overturning legislation.
B.

Substantive Due Processas a Limitation on Police Power

The substantive due process doctrine has limited the exercise of police
power in both federal and Washington law. 9 5 The concept of substantive
193. See generally Epstein, supra note 2.
194. Philip Weinberg, Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey: Will the Supreme CourtStretch the
Takings Clause Beyond the BreakingPoint?,26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 315, 315-16 (1999).
195. The U.S. Constitution provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. const. amend. XVI. Similarly, the
Washington Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." Wash. Const. art. I, § 3.
At first blush, the notion of substantive due process appears to be an oxymoron that confuses
procedure and substance. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting that
substantive due process is oxymoron and procedural due process is redundancy); Newell v. Brown,
981 F.2d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting substantive due process is "durable oxymoron"); Brower
v. Inyo County, 817 F.2d 540, 544 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting "[i]t
is probably too late to express
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due process finds its origin in the belief that certain liberty and property
interests are beyond the power of the government to affect.'96 The

doctrine finds its most extreme expression in Washington land-use cases,
involving a formulation that virtually encourages the judiciary to
legislate without restraint any time it disagrees with a legislative
enactment.
The early federal cases employing substantive due process to analyze
government actions applied a test very similar to the police power test. In
Mugler v. Kansas,'97 the U.S. Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of a state statute in light of due process principles,
finding the prohibition on manufacturing alcohol to be constitutional. In
so doing, the Court announced a two-part test to evaluate the substance
of a regulation. 9 ' The action must have a "real or substantial relation" to
an appropriate public purpose and the action cannot be a "palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law." '
Federal courts have employed substantive due process as a limitation
on the exercise of the police power.2" Substantive due process protects
those rights that are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." ' ' The concept of substantive
due process is inexorably tied to this nation's history and traditions, and

serves to safeguard those rights "'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
continuing dismay over the use of the oxymoron 'substantive due process."'); United States v.
Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Arnold, J., concurring) (noting substantive
due process is "an oxymoron if ever there was one"); cf. Ely, supra note 27; Ross A. MacFarlane,
Testing the Constitutional Validity ofLand Use Regulations:Substantive Due Processas a Superior
Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 715 (1982).
196. Archibald Cox suggested American jurists long understood due process to encompass more
than fairness of procedure. Archibald Cox, The Court andthe Constitution 122 (1987).
197. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
198. See id. at 674.
199. Id. at 661; see generallyLawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (discussing police power and
substantive due process). The Court employed this formulation of substantive due process in
upholding local land-use regulation. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (upholding local zoning law); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding Los
Angeles ordinance banning brick manufacture).
200. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (noting that substantive due process is
limitation on all powers of Congress).
201. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)); see also State v. Wheeler, 95 Wash. 2d 799, 804, 631 P.2d 376 (1981).
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sacrificed.' 20 2 However, the burden on the plaintiff in federal
substantive due process cases is extraordinarily heavy. As the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:
In order to survive the County's summary judgment motion, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate the irrational nature of the County's
actions by showing that the County "could have had no legitimate
reason for its decision." ... If it is "at least fairly debatable" that
the County's conduct is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest, there has been no violation of substantive
due process."'
In effect, if an enactment meets the traditional police-power test, it
cannot be said to violate substantive due process in a federal case.
Washington extended the substantive due process doctrine to land-use
cases. The concept of substantive due process as a constitutional theory
upon which to base challenges to governmental actions first appeared in
Washington case law with little fanfare and even less authority in Norco
Construction, Inc. v. King County,2° where the court suggested due
process was a limiting principle for zoning ordinances.2 5 Later, in West
Main Asssociates v. City of Bellevue, °6 the Washington court stated
202. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)) (stating limits on substantive due process come not from
drawing arbitrary lines but rather from respect for history and values that underlie our society).
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized several fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause, including the right to marry and have children, the right to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children, the right to use contraception, the right to bodily integrity, and the right
to abortion. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720; see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). The
Court has not been particularly precise in enunciating whether fundamental rights emanate from the
Constitution, or predate the Constitution and receive protection through the Due Process Clause. For
instance, in the famous case Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court said, "[t]he
present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees," indicating the privacy right at issue stemmed from the
Constitution. Id. at 485. A few sentences later, however, the Court said, "[w]e deal with a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system."
Id. at 486.
203. Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Kawaoka v. City
of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1238 (1994)); see also Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi
Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir. 1989) ("To establish a violation of substantive due process,
the plaintiffs must prove that the government's action was 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' (quoting
Village ofEuclid, 272 U.S. at 395)).
204. 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).
205. See id. at 685, 649 P.2d at 106.
206. 106 Wash. 2d 47, 720 P.2d 782 (1986).
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categorically that "a land use ordinance satisfies due process standards
only if it (1) is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose, and (2)
uses means to achieve that purpose that are reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals."2 7 In Orion Corp. v. State,208 the
court attempted to harmonize the conflicting Washington case law on
takings, the police power, and the balancing of interests by adopting the
three-part test for police-power excess stated in Goldblatt for substantive

due process violations in land-use cases. 2° Ultimately, in Washington, "a
land-use regulation which too drastically curtails owners' use of their
' 20
property... can constitute a denial of substantive due process. '

In this context, substantive due process offers a more powerful means
of invalidating the State's exercise of the police power than the Takings

Clause. Unlike takings claims, substantive due process claims do not
21
require proof that the regulation has denied all use of one's property. '

Substantive due process rights protect property owners from any
irrational or arbitrary interference with their property rights." 2 Thus,
arbitrary or irrational interference with processing a land-use permit also
207. Id. at 52, 720 P.2d at 786; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead 369 U.S. 590, 594-95
(1962); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). This test for excessive land-use regulation

overruled sub silentio strongly-worded prior opinions to the contrary on the question of substantive
due process. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar.Ass'n, 83 Wash. 2d
523, 520 P.2d 162 (1974), after reviewing the history of substantive due process cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Washington court stated:
This unfortunate history of the due process clause in the United States Supreme Court presents
to this court a sobering lesson in the necessity for judicial deference to the legislature in the
exercise of its police power to accomplish economic regulation. Were we to accept appellants'
invitation to void the act here on substantive due process grounds, we would set a precedent for
embarking upon a course already traveled and finally rejected by the United States Supreme
Court
Id. at 534,520 P.2d at 169 (rejecting challenge to constitutionality of Washington Life and Disability
Insurance Guaranty Association Act); see also Farrell v. City of Seattle, 75 Wash. 2d 540, 543, 452
P.2d 965, 967 (1969) (holding courts will not review zoning decisions except for manifest abuse of
discretion involving arbitrary and capricious conduct).
208. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
209. See id. at 647-48, 747 P.2d at 1076.
210. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990).
This expression echoes Holmes's famous declaration from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922): "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, ifregulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
211. See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 61, 830 P.2d 318,334 (1992).
212. See Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1,21, 829 P.2d 765, 776 (1992) (finding
governmental regulations violate property owner's right to substantive due process if interference
resulting from regulation is arbitrary or irrational).
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violates substantive due process. 211Unfortunately for the development of
a predictable jurisprudence, what constitutes arbitrary or irrational
interference is often in the eye of the beholder. Too often, the validity of
a land-use determination
becomes, in court, subject to the measure of the
214
Chancellor's foot.
In determining whether a regulation violates a property owner's right
to substantive due process, the court engages in a balancing test
considering the purpose, means, and effect of the regulation. A court
considers three questions:
(1) whether the regulation is aimed at achieving a legitimate
public purpose;
(2) whether it uses means that are reasonably necessary to achieve
that purpose; and
(3) whether it is unduly oppressive on the landowner.215
The party challenging the legislation has the burden of proving a
violation of substantive due process.2 16 In this context, the Washington
court has emphasized the need for judicial deference to the legislature's
exercise of the police power to accomplish economic regulation.2 7 The
213. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 970, 954 P.2d 250 (1998);
Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91, 125, 829 P.2d 746 (1992) (denial of
conditional-use permit violates substantive due process if the denial is "invidious or irrational" or
"arbitrary or capricious"); see generally Eric Jenkins, Note, Challenging Land Use Actions Under
Section 1983: Washington Law After Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 74 Wash. L. Rev.
853 (1999).
214. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332-33
(1999):
For law we have a measure, and know what to trust to-Equity is according to the conscience of
him, that is Chancellor; and as that is larger, or narrower, so is Equity. Tis all one, as if they
should make the standard for the measure the Chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure
would this be? One Chancellor has a long foot; another a short foot; a third an indifferent foot. It
is the same thing with the Chancellor's conscience.
Id. (quoting Joseph Story, I Commentarieson Equity Jurisprudence§ 19, at 21).
215. See Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 21, 829 P.2d at 776 (quoting Presbytery of Seattle, 114 Wash.
2d at 330, 707 P.2d at 913); see also Christianson v. Snohomish Health Dist., 133 Wash. 2d 647,
661, 946 P.2d 768, 774 (1997); Rivett v. City of Tacoma, 123 Wash. 2d 573, 581, 870 P.2d 299, 303
(1994).
216. See Christianson, 133 Wash. 2d at 661, 946 P.2d at 773.
217. See Omega Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Marquardt, 115 Wash. 2d 416, 430, 799 P.2d 235, 242 (1990),
superseded by statute as stated in Neah Bay Chamber of Commerce v. Department of Fisheries, 119
Wash. 2d 464, 832 P.2d 1310 (1992).
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remedy for a substantive due process violation is the invalidation of the
state law.2 8
As noted in Christianson v. Snohomish Health District, the third
prong of the substantive due process analysis is normally "difficult and
determinative."219 The purpose of this prong is to prevent landowners
from shouldering economic burdens more properly borne by the public
as a whole.'22 To ascertain whether the regulation is unduly oppressive,
the court must balance the interests of the public against those of the
landowner." In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, the Washington
court set out a number of factors to consider when making this
determination, including the nature of the harm sought to be avoided, the
availability of less drastic measures, and the economic harm suffered by
the property owner.'
Washington's formulation of substantive due process in the land-use
context, however, goes far beyond any federal case law, effectively
elevating any erroneous decision by a local government to the status of a
federal constitutional tort. In Hayes v. City of Seattle,' for example, the
Washington court declined to reach the question of whether an erroneous
land-use decision by the city allowed the developer to state a claim
against the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'22 Instead, the court allowed
recovery under state law.' However, in Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle,2 6
the Washington court squarely permitted a developer aggrieved by an
erroneous local land-use decision to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 2
By contrast, federal courts have been careful to note not every
"arbitrary and capricious" local land-use decision establishes a
constitutional tort." Moreover, the federal courts have delineated an
218. See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34,49,830 P.2d 318,327 (1992).
219. Christianson, 133 Wash. 2d at 664, 946 P.2d at 776; see also Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51,
830 P.2d at 329.
220. See Christianson, 133 Wash. 2d at 664, 946 P.2d at 780.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51-52, 830 P.2d at 329.
See Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320,329,787 P.2d 907,912 (1990).
131 Wash. 2d 706,934 P.2d 1179 (1997).
See id. at 718, 934 P.2d at 1185.

225. See id.at 714-18, 934 P.2d at 1185.
226. 131 Wash. 2d 640,935 P.2d 555 (1997).
227. See id. at 654, 935 P.2d at 563.
228. See, e.g., Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 829 n.7 (4th Cir. 1995):
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exceedingly narrow ambit for substantive due process challenges to local
land-use decisions.229 In Armendariz v. Penman,2 30 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, held substantive due
process does not extend to areas addressed by more specific provisions
of the Constitution, rejecting its use to invalidate routine land-use
decisions. The court concluded the plaintiffs' substantive due process
But to conclude that every agency decision reversed as "arbitrary and capricious" under state or
federal administrative law rises to the level of a constitutional claim would distort the
substantive due process doctrine. As the courts have consistently recognized, the inquiry into
"arbitrariness" under the Due Process Clause is completely distinct from and far narrower than
the inquiry into "arbitrariness" under state or federal administrative law . . . While
administrative law focuses on whether an agency's decision was supported by record evidence
and abided by statutory criteria, substantive due process inquiries into the conceivable outer
limits of legitimate government power.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
229. See, e.g., Sintra, 131 Wash. 2d at 684-85 (Talmadge, J., concurring and dissenting):
[S]omething more than a mere violation of state land-use law must be present before a cause of
action is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of substantive due process. "A violation of
state law is not a denial of due process of law." Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844
F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988); "It is bedrock law in this circuit, however, that violations of state
law-even where arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken in bad faith-do not, without more, give rise to
a denial of substantive due process under the U.S. Constitution." Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972
F.2d 440,444 (1st Cir. 1992); Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City ofPhiladelphia,945 F.2d 667, 684 (3d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992); Steuart v. Suskie, 867 F.2d 1148, 1150 (8th Cir. 1989);
Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield,963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992):
[I]n zoning and land-use disputes with local governments, the plaintiff must allege something
more than that the government decision was arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law. Such
claims, if asserted, are better addressed to state courts and administrative bodies. Otherwise, every
violation of state law could be turned into a federal constitutional tort.
See also Sintra, 131 Wash.2d at 684 n.30 (Talmadge, J., concurring and dissenting):
The federal circuit courts of appeal employ various exceedingly restrictive tests for finding
substantive due process, thereby reflecting their oft-stated aversion to sitting as federal zoning
boards of appeal. See Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1995) (Due Process
Clause does not function as general overseer of arbitrariness in state and local land-use
decisions). Some courts look only for a "rational basis" behind the decision, a very relaxed
standard of review. See Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 618 (1st Cir. 1990). Others
hold only decisions that "shock the conscience" are worthy of constitutional protection. See
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Others look for decisions animated by bad faith, bias, or improper motive. See Midnight
Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991). The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit treats all land-use decisions, even those Washington would characterize as
quasi-judicial, as legislative acts, requiring only the least judicial scrutiny. See Shelton v. City of
College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 479-83 (5th Cir. 1986). Other courts hold that substantive due
process protection applies only to fundamental rights, such as marriage and family privacy, and
not to land-use decisions. See, e.g., Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 1994).
230. 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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claims were preempted by other constitutional claims, and noted using
substantive due process to extend constitutional protections to economic
and property rights had been largely discredited."3 The court cautioned
that invoking substantive due process in areas "not grounded in explicit
[constitutional] protections" left courts to make decisions without
limitations or guidance. 2 When an explicit constitutional provision
specifically protects against government behavior, that provision, rather
than the more general notion of substantive due process, should serve as
the proper method of analysis. 3 Accordingly, in the Ninth Circuit's
view, the Takings Clause provides the appropriate framework for
analyzing land-use claims.
The concept of substantive due process represents the worst-case
scenario for judicial subversion of legislative decision making. Absent
clear articulation of decisional guidelines, the judiciary substitutes its
judgment for that of elected officials who are closer to the issue and
better able to broker the interests at stake in the public-policy setting.
The Supreme Court of Washington's extreme interpretation of the role of
substantive due process finds no authority in federal case law.
IV. OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROPER ROLE OF POLICE
POWER AND PROPERTY
It is readily apparent that the exercise of police power has been seen as
a fundamental aspect of government by political philosophers,
constitutional framers, and judges. This power, however, is not unlimited in its scope, particularly as to citizens' interests in property. The
constitutional limitations on the exercise of the police power inherent in
takings law and Washington's expansive treatment of substantive due
process are significant.
Yet these limitations do not satisfy those who would elevate property
interests over the need to exercise police power to ensure the coexistence
of citizens in civil society. These advocates raise the individual or
atomistic interest in property above the societal interest in every
231. See id. at 1318-19.
232. Id. at 1319.
233. See id.; see also South County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d
834, 835 (1st Cir. 1998); Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1996); Tinney v. Shores,
77 F.3d 378,381 (1 th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1182 (7th Cir.

1994).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 75:857, 2000

circumstance. Their belief flows from a flawed conception of property as

a natural right distinct from its context in civil society.
Property cannot be understood outside its societal context. 34 The
yeoman farmer with land on the outskirts of the Roman empire in the
fifth century A.D. could hardly articulate a natural right to his land in the
face of disagreement by Attila and the Huns. That farmer's property
234. See supra note 22. Rights to property, of course, change with society's advancement. Justice
Dunbar, one of the drafters of the Washington State Constitution, recognized as early as 1902 how
the changing needs of society result in new laws and new concepts of law. In a case holding
constitutional an act limiting the number of hours women could be required to work in one day in
mechanical and mercantile establishments, he said for a unanimous court:
Law is, or ought to be, a progressive science ....
Blackstone [wrote] that when man enters into
society, as a compensation for the protection which society gives to him, he must yield up some
of his natural rights, and, as the responsibilities of the govemment increase, and a greater degree
of protection is afforded to the citizen, the recompense is the yielding of more individual rights
....The changing conditions of society have made an imperative call upon the state for the
exercise of these additional powers, and the welfare of society demands that the state should
assume these powers, and it is the duty of the court to sustain them whenever it is found that
they are based upon the idea of the promotion and protection of society.
State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 610-611, 70 P. 52, 54 (1902). This case, written at the height of
the Lochner era (although Lochner itself was not decided until 1905), exemplifies the Progressive
attitudes of Washington's founders. But cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding statelaw limitation on the number of hours bakers could work unconstitutional), overruled by Day-Brite
Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
As an illustration of how property rights change as society progresses, consider the following
facially unobjectionable statement:

[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property,
merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United
States, and who had committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the
name of due process of law.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856). The "property" Chief Justice Taney
referred to in this case was the slave Dred Scott. The Court there held "a negro of the African race
[is] ...
an article of property, and held, and bought and sold as such." Id. at 408. The citizens of the
United States changed that abhorrent definition of property by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, of course, but not without opposition from those who thought freeing the slaves was a
taking of property without just compensation. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 2941
(1864) (remarks of Representative Wood); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 437, 444 n.41 (1989) (citing Representative Wood). Indeed, when
Congress abolished slavery in the District of Columbia on April 16, 1862, it provided for payments
of up to $300 per slave to the former slave owners as remuneration for their loss of "property." 12
Stat. LIV (1862). Although one may read such facts today with repugnance and horror, the former
treatment of slaves as property illustrates how concepts of property evolve and change as American
society evolves and changes.
However, even without considering societal evolution, "neither property rights nor contract rights
are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment
of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm." Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (upholding constitutionality of statute setting minimum price for milk).
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interest was only valuable to the extent the Emperor could maintain the
pax Romana or the Germanic hordes suffered him and his family to
remain on the land. Without the institutions of civil society to recognize
property ownership, including rights of conveyance, purchase, and
enjoyment, and the authority sufficient to enforce that recognition,
property can be owned and used only by the strong and powerful, or only
at their sufferance." 5 As Jeremy Bentham stated,
I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as mine,

except through the promise of the law which guarantees it to me
....It is only through the protection of law that I am able to
inclose a field, and to give myself up to its cultivation with the sure
though distant hope of harvest. 6
To contend either philosophically or in constitutional terms that there

is a "zone of absolute property"

7

outside of any governmental reach is

235. Society generally confirms the conveyance and transmission of property interests by titling and
inheritance laws. As Blackstone said:
The origin of private property is probably founded in nature ...but certainly the modifications
under which we at present find it, the method of conserving it in the present owner, and of
translating it from man to man, are entirely derived from society: as are some of those civil
advantages, in exchange for which, every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty.
2 Blackstone's Commentaries 138 (St. George Tucker ed., Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969) (1803). To
illustrate the necessity for a societal framework in order for property rights to exist, consider Wash.
Rev. Code § 59.23.030, a statute granting mobile-home tenants a chance to bid on a potential sale of
the mobile-home park and setting forth sanctions for park owners' failure to comply: "If the court
determines that the notice provisions of this chapter have been violated, the court shall issue an order
setting aside the improper sale.'
Surely, as an order affecting real property, someone would record the order with the county auditor,
where it would appear with the description of the relevant parcel. The order setting aside the
improper sale would effectively reconvey the land to the park owner because the improper
conveyance would no longer be of record. The purported purchaser would thus be unable to enforce
any rights to the property. He could not seek assistance from the sheriff to "exclude others" because
he could not establish the land belonged to him in the absence of society's recognition of the
conveyance. He could not sell the land because he would find no buyers for land to which he could
not show clear title. He could not enforce collection of rents from the mobile-home tenants because
to do so, he would have to set forth in a complaint that he is the landlord entitled to the rents, and
while he may allege as much, he can never prove he is the landlord because there is no record of his
ownership the law recognizes as valid. In such a case, while there may have been a valid contract for
the sale of land between a willing seller and a willing buyer, without society's imprimatur, no
cognizable conveyance of title occurred.
236. Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 112 (C.K. Ogden ed. & Richard Hildreth trans.,
Harcourt, Brace and Co. 193 1).
237. Professor Glendon refers to this as the "illusion of absoluteness." See Glendon, supra note
16, at 18. She notes:
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simply wrong. Property is an important social interest with particular
types of constitutional guarantees to the individual, but it is not an
absolute interest and cannot be understood outside its societal context.
Communitarian principles, as well as concepts of social responsibility,
dictate the need for a mechanism to adjust individual interests in conflict.
The police power touches upon the core functions of government. Its
exercise is designed to preserve the public peace, safety, health, and
welfare-the exact reasons for the creation of civil government. To a
very real extent, the police power coincides with the power of
government itself. Certainly the power of government ought not to be
diminished in the face of property use adversely affecting the public
order. For example, one cannot seriously argue for a property right to
dispose of raw sewage on one's land in the middle of a city or an
unfettered right to play a stereo at maximum volume in the wee hours of
the morning in a residential neighborhood. The exercise of the police
power is necessary to adjust interpersonal relationships in such a way as
to facilitate the general ability to live together in society. 3
Absoluteness is an illusion, and hardly a harmless one. When we assert our rights to life,
liberty, and property, we are expressing the reasonable hope that such things can be made more
secure by law and politics. When we assert these rights in an absolute form, however, we are
expressing infinite and impossible desires-to be completely free, to possess things totally, to
be captains of our fate, and masters of our souls. There is pathos as well as bravado in these
attempts to deny the fragility and contingency of human existence, personal freedom, and the
possession of worldly goods. As John Updike recently observed, a certain unreflective
Utopianism has undeniably been an important part of the American experience-Utopianism
that, as it crumbles in our own time, gives way to "a naive, unending surprise and indignation
that life is as it is. We cannot, unlike the Europeans, quite get over it."
The exaggerated absoluteness of our American rights rhetoric is closely bound up with its other
distinctive traits-a near-silence concerning responsibility, and a tendency to envision the rightsbearer as a lone autonomous individual. Thus, for example, those who contest the legitimacy of
mandatory automobile seat-belt or motorcycle-helmet laws frequently say: "It's my body and I have
the right to do as I please with it." In this shibboleth, the old horse of property is harnessed to the
service of an unlimited liberty. The implication is that no one else is affected by my exercise of the
individual right in question. This way of thinking and speaking ignores the fact that it is a rare driver,
passenger, or biker who does not have a child, or a spouse, or a parent. It glosses over the likelihood
that if the rights-bearer comes to grief, the cost of his medical treatment, or rehabilitation, or longterm care will be spread among many others. The independent individualist, helmetless and free on
the open road, becomes the most dependent of individuals in the spinal injury ward. In the face of
such facts, why does our rhetoric of rights so often shut out relationship and responsibility, along
with reality?
Id. at 45-46.
238. Many have argued the greatest governmental success story of twentieth-century America is a
relatively obscure governmental program-public health. The massive national commitment to the
construction of sanitary sewers, safe drinking-water systems, and solid-waste facilities probably has
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Of course, exercise of the police power can go too far. The courts
reserve the right to determine if an ordinance, statute, or regulation
reasonably addresses a public safety, health, morals, or welfare issue.
Moreover, there are constitutional limits to the scope of the police power.
The traditional takings analysis-physical invasion of property interests
by government or regulations effectively depriving property of all viable
economic uses-and substantive due process doctrine constitute very
effective brakes on excessive use of the police power.
The debate on the exercise of police power with regard to property
should take a new form. While substantive due process is a limitation on
the state's exercise of police power, the doctrines of regulatory takings
and substantive due process appear "analytically identical." 9 The
substantive due process test closely approximates the test to determine
whether a regulation is a valid exercise of the police power. Police-power
analysis requires a court to determine whether a regulation promotes the
general interests of the public through reasonably necessary means.2"
This is only slightly different from substantive due process analysis.
Both analyses look closely at the purpose of the regulation to ensure that
it serves a legitimate public purpose.24' Similarly, both substantive due
process analysis and analysis of a state's exercise of police power look at
the means employed by the regulation and the effect the regulation has
on the landowner.24 Despite the differences in the articulated tests,
resolution under both tests hinges on the reasonableness of the
regulation.243
Given the similarities between the two tests, the question of what
function the doctrine of substantive due process should serve in propertyrights cases remains. This question is especially relevant because landuse regulations violating substantive due process in Washington are
likely to be found invalid exercises of the state's police power. Because
done more for Americans' health and longevity than any similar national effort. See, e.g., Allyn L.
Taylor, Controlling the Global Spread of Infectious Diseases: Toward a Reinforced Role for the
InternationalHealth Regulations, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 1327, 1332 (1997) (asserting that "[b]y the
middle of the twentieth century ... the development of therapeutic and preventive interventions, as
well as the improvement of sanitary conditions, led to dramatic successes in the prevention and
control of infectious diseases in industrialized states.").
239. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621,646, 747 P.2d 1062, 1076 (1987).
240. See supranotes 140-41 and accompanying text.

241. See Orion Corp, at 647, 747 P.2d at 1076.
242. See id,
243. See id at 648, 747 P.2d at 1076.
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the notion of substantive due process adds nothing to the analysis of
property-rights cases, courts should limit the use of the substantive due
process doctrine to cases involving those fundamental rights enumerated
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, Washington courts should eschew
the vague principles of substantive due process and adhere to explicit
constitutional provisions.2"
Washington has gone astray by extending the substantive due process
doctrine to land-use regulations. Substantive due process analysis has no
place in cases involving the regulation of property.24 Property rights
cases can be adequately resolved using either a takings or police-power
analysis.246
In effect, the focus should rest on traditional police-power concerns
rather than the concept of substantive due process. There are certain
fundamental rights, described by the U.S. Supreme Court in its
substantive due process jurisprudence, that are properly beyond the reach
of government'spolice power. Lest the courts arrogate to themselves the
right to legislate, courts should be extraordinarily cautious about making
all interests "fundamental." For the remainder of non-fundamental
matters, courts should determine whether the government's exercise of
police power meets the traditional test of a nexus between a
governmental interest and reasonableness in means employed.
Finally, the exercise of police power is a political issue. In a recent
book, Philip Howard notes circumstances in which government has
adopted foolish, excessive, or simply unnecessary laws and
regulations.247 Politicians revel in decrying such governmental abuses.24
244. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (finding excessive-force claim im-properly
analyzed on substantive due process principles where explicit constitutional provision applies);
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996).
245. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has enumerated a class of rights it calls fundamental, see,
e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833(1992) (procreation); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 495 (1977) (family); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (vote), it has never accorded property rights the same status.
246. See, e.g., South County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 836
(1st Cir. 1998) ("[A]Ithough the substantive limits of the Takings Clause may not necessarily
coincide with the substantive limits of the Due Process Clause in every imaginable context ... the
limits are congruent in this instance.").
247. See generally Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating
America (1994).
248. See generally, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of
Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1151 (1997) (detailing several
politicians' recitations of horribles in land-use regulation).
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Regulatory reform measures are frequently introduced by legislators to
"control" bureaucracy and excessive rules.249
The lesson to be gleaned from all this is that, apart from the doctrinal

limits on the police power, there is a major limit on the police power in
the American system of government: the democratic electoral process. If
government goes too far in enacting stupid or ineffective laws, or if
otherwise salutary laws are administered carelessly, U.S. history shows a
political opposition will arise. The self-corrective feature of democratic
government is a significant check on governmental abuse, and is often
overlooked by advocates of greater constitutional limits on the police

power. Indeed, local elections for city and county legislative bodies often
turn on issues of regulation, land-use intensity, and growth and sprawl.
Moreover, legislative bodies can provide, and have provided, recourse
for citizens adversely affected by arbitrary governmental actions
respecting land use 5 0
249. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform, ch. 403, 1995 Wash. Laws 2160-213; Regulatory Reform Act,
ch. 249, 1994 Wash. Laws 1378-405. Both Regulatory Reform Acts were the subject of extensive
gubernatorial vetoes. As to the 1995 version of regulatory reform, the governor's veto message
noted: "Over the last few years, the issue of regulatory reform has generated spirited discussion and
debate. I have come to the conclusion that, like beauty, regulatory reform is really in the eye of the
beholder. While there is widespread agreement about the problems, there is less clarity regarding
solutions." Regulatory Reform, ch. 403, 1995 Wash. Laws at 2210.
250. The Washington legislature enacted Revised Code of Washington section 64A0 in 1982. In
its key provision, the statute provides:
(1)

Owners of a property interest who have filed an application for a permit have an action
for damages to obtain relief from acts of an agency which are arbitrary, capricious,
unlawful, or exceed lawful authority, or relief from a failure to act within time limits
established by law: Provided,That the action is unlawful or in excess of lawful authority
only if the final decision of the agency was made with knowledge of its unlawfulness or
that it was in excess of lawful authority, or it should reasonably have been known to have
been unlawful or in excess of lawful authority.

(2) The prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to this chapter may be entitled to
reasonable costs and attorney's fees.
Wash. Rev. Code § 64.40.020 (1982). Recently, the legislature provided a more expeditious remedy
to those aggrieved by government land-use decisions by enacting the Land Use Petition Act. Wash.
Rev. Code § 36.70C (1995).
Washington's extraordinarily expansive conception of vested rights also reflects legislative
deference to concerns about government activities intruding upon the right to develop property.
Under this doctrine, an application for a government permit "vests" the applicant in the law then
prevailing. See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.27.095 (1998); see also Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County,
133 Wash. 2d 269,943 P.2d 1378 (1997); Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d 864,
872 P.2d 1090 (1994).
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Courts should not elevate every dispute about the scope of the police
power to a constitutional level where the political mechanism is
functioning, largely because the police power is so essential to effective
governance in modem society. In their constitutional role, courts should
afford the political process the maximum opportunity to decide issues
regarding the scope of government's police power. Certainly, questions
like those of food safety, zoning density, or on-site sanitary systems
should be decided by legislative or executive branch agencies closer to
the will of the people and the interests involved. The judiciary should not
attempt to co-opt such political debates by elevating them to
constitutional status.25'
V.

CONCLUSION

Dean Acheson, a law clerk to Justice Louis Brandeis during the
heyday of the Lochner era, wrote of that dolorous period in American
constitutional law, "Today it seems very odd indeed that until this
century was more than four decades old the U.S. Supreme Court was of
the opinion that the Founding Fathers had put it beyond the power of any
government in the land to protect those historic wards of the law, women
and children, from exploitation by the owners of machines." 2 Perhaps a
much shorter time will pass in the twenty-first century before the U.S.
Supreme Court realizes-and reads the Constitution as Jefferson,
Marshall, Franklin, and Chase, among others, understood it-that
community interests in property must triumph over the possessive,
individualistic approach to property the property-rights absolutists
advocate. As for the Supreme Court of Washington, given its
Progressive, anti-Lochner approach to the plight of working people one
hundred years ago, one can reasonably hope it will be even swifter than
the U.S. Supreme Court to acknowledge and uphold community values
in its land-use decisions.
In the end, the exercise of police power in a modem society is
essential to its continued existence. That such power extends to property
interests is not new, and should not be diminished. However, "[n]either
property nor police power is an absolute right; each evolves contextually
251. See Philip A. Talmadge, Understandingthe Limits ofPower: Judicial Restraint in General
JurisdictionCourtSystems, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 695 (1999).
252. Dean Acheson, Morning andNoon 112-13 (1965).
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and over time." ' 3 Opponents of the exercise of police power, whose
purpose may be to hobble government generally, should not invariably
look to constitutional restraints as a safeguard against excessively
intrusive government action. Instead, they should avoid the notion that
government is inherently ill-willed and should invoke the democratic
process to curtail government if the police power is misused.
253. Douglas W. Kmiec, Insertingthe Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 Win. &

Mary L. Rev. 995, 1012 n.78 (1997).
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